ITEM 9-A
Santa Monica, California
City Council Mtg. July 7, 1992
TO: Mayor and City Council
FROM: City Staff
SUBJECT: Charter Review Commission Recommendations
Introduction
This report presents the final report and recommendations of the
Charter Review Commission for Council review and consideration.
Background
The 15-member Charter Review Commission was appointed by the City
Council to review several specific issues relating to the current
City Charter. The accompanying report presents a summary of the
Commission discussions and recommendations on these matters. An
Executive Summary is provided at the front of the document for
ease of reference.
Commission and Staff members will be present at the July 7
meeting to make a brief presentation and to answer any questions
the Council may have.
It should further be noted that a letter from the Rent Control
Board is provided with these documents requesting Council
consideration of a change relating to election of Rent Control
Commissioners to fill vacant, unexpired terms. The Charter
Review Commission received the letter at their July 1, 1992
meeting and asked that it be forwarded to Council for
consideration at this time.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the Council receive the report of the
Charter Review Commission for discussion and provide direction to
Staff as desired.
Prepared by: Lynne C.Barrette, Assistant City Manager
June 29, 1992
Mayor and City Council:
On July 11, 1990 the City Council directed the City Attorney to
prepare an ordinance creating a Charter Review Commission. This
ordinance was introduced and passed by the City Council at its
meeting of October 2, 1990.
Nancy Greenstein was appointed as Chair of the Commission and
Stephen Alpert, Abby Arnold, Russell Barnard, Timi Hallem,
Christopher Harding, George Hickey, Patricia Hoffman, Ilona Katz,
Tom Larmore, Peggy Lyons, Herman Rosenstein, Tom Soto, William
Spurgin, Peter Tigler were appointed as members by the City
Council at its meeting of February 19, 1991.
We were sworn in at our first meeting on April 3rd, the first of
twelve sessions that year. In the course of our discussions, we
drew on the resources of community members, City Council members
from other local municipalities, academic experts, City staff,
and extensive reading and research in governmental affairs and
relevant political science books and journals.
In 1992, with Commissioner M. Douglas Willis (after attending
several meetings) replacing Commissioner Soto, the Commission
held seven further meetings and one public forum, extensively
publicized through leaflets, PEN, and the media.
As the enabling ordinance for this Commission expired on March
31, we submit herewith the results of our research and
deliberations. We feel that the majority of the tasks set before
us have been brought to a satisfactory closure. At the same
time, there remain questions on the subjects referred to us by
Council on which we would have preferred to deliberate at further
length.
In addition, there were some additional issues, outside of our
charge which we wish to put forward for Council consideration.
They are as follows:
Charter-related
1) We recommend that the language in the Charter be revised to be
gender neutral.
2) We recommend that the method of appointment to vacancies on
the City Council and Rent Control Board be reviewed for possible
modification.
3) Depending on the outcome of the Council electoral system
discussion, we recommend that the method of selection of Rent
Control Board members be reviewed.
4) We propose addition of an Environmental Commission to the
Charter.
5) We recommend that provisions be added to the Charter requiring
periodic review of the various Charter provisions and amendments
as deemed necessary.
City Council Policy Issues
1) Depending on the outcome of the Council electoral system
issue, the Commission suggests that the Santa Monica Malibu
Unified School District Board and Santa Monica College Trustees
be encouraged to review their electoral systems.
2) If the Council should decide to proceed with a recommendation
to change the City's electoral system, the Commission recommends
that the Council also examine campaign finance reform, ethics and
the establishment of a Fair Political Practices Commission with
greater authority than the previous City Fair Political Practices
Commission.
3) The Commission further recommends that the Council consider
hiring support staff.
We are happy to discuss, with members of the Council, our work
and our conclusions, and remain ready to assist in whatever next
steps the Council may feel are appropriate in concluding the
process of Charter review.
Respectfully submitted,
Nancy Greenstein, Chairperson
Stephen Alpert, Member
Abby Arnold, Member
Russell Barnard, Member
Timi Hallem, Member
Christopher Harding, Member
George Hickey, Member
Patricia Hoffman, Member
Ilona Jo Katz, Member
Tom Larmore, Member
Peggy Lyons, Member
Herman Rosenstein, Member
William Spurgin, Member
Peter Tigler, Member
Doug Willis, Member
Assisted by:
Lynne C. Barrette, Assistant City Manager
Joe Lawrence, Assistant City Attorney
Clarice Dykhouse, City Clerk
John Seeley, Sr. Management Analyst
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.......................................... 1a
METHOD OF SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF CITY COUNCIL AND MAYOR... 1
FOREWARD................................................ 1
PROCESS................................................. 2
CONCLUSIONS............................................. 4
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.................... 7
OBJECTIVES AND VALUES................................... 9
Accountability and Accessibility..................... 10
Ethnic Diversity..................................... 12
Neighborhood Empowerment and Voter Participation..... 13
Reducing Slate Dominance............................. 14
AT-LARGE ELECTIONS...................................... 15
Mechanics and Usage.................................. 15
Appraisal............................................ 18
DISTRICTS............................................... 22
Mechanics and Usage.................................. 22
Appraisal............................................ 24
MIXED SYSTEMS........................................... 28
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION............................. 29
Philosophy........................................... 29
SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE................................ 31
Mechanics and Usage.................................. 31
Appraisal............................................ 32
CUMULATIVE VOTING....................................... 36
Mechanics and Usage.................................. 36
Appraisal............................................ 39
VOTING RIGHTS QUESTIONS................................. 41
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR CITY COUNCIL................. 48
Discussion and Recommendation........................... 48
LIMITATION ON TERMS OFFICE OF CITY COUNCIL................. 53
Discussion and Recommendation........................... 53
SELECTION OF CITY ATTORNEY AND CITY CLERK................. 56
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 56
ESTABLISHMENT OF BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS................... 58
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 58
METHOD OF SELECTION OF PLANNING COMMISSION................ 59
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 59
COUNCIL MEETINGS.......................................... 66
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 67
CITY HEALTH OFFICER....................................... 71
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 71
CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY .................................. 74
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 74
COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS.............. 76
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 77
OFFICIAL BONDS............................................ 81
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 81
CASH BASIS FUND AND CAPITAL OUTLAYS FUND.................. 83
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 84
PRESENTATION OF DEMANDS................................... 86
Discussion and Recommendation.......................... 86
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The following is provided as a brief summary of the Commission's
recommendations on the issues requested by City Council:
1. Question: The method of selection of members of the City
Council and Mayor?
Recommendation: That the method of selection be changed
with first preference for a form of proportional
representation and second preference for a form of district
elections.
2. Question: Whether or not City Charter Section 602 should be
amended to provide compensation and benefits for members of
the City Council and if so, what compensation and benefits
should be provided?
Recommendation: That the Charter set compensation ceilings
in accordance with the population - based formula used for
general law cities and that voters be asked as a separate
question to extend the same insurance benefits (with the
exception of participation in the retirement system) to
Councilmembers as are available to the top administrative
bargaining unit of Santa Monica City employees.
3. Question: Whether or not any limitation should be placed on
the terms of office of members of the City Council?
Recommendation: That there be a limit of three consecutive
4-year terms for Councilmembers.
4. Question: The method of selection of the City Attorney and
City Clerk?
Recommendation: That the current method of selection remain
unchanged.
5. Question: Review Article X of the City Charter to determine
whether or not the Boards and Commissions established
thereby should continue to be mandated by the City Charter
and review the method of selection of the Planning
Commission?
Recommendation: That the Boards and Commissions currently
listed in the Charter remain with a modification in title of
the Recreation Commission to Recreation and Parks
Commission. That the method of selection of the Planning
Commission remain unchanged but that there be some
modifications in certain other Charter provisions related to
the Planning Commission.
6&7 Question: Whether City Charter Section 612 relating to
special meetings should be amended to conform to the Brown
Act and whether Section 613 should be amended to provide
more flexibility to holding Council meetings within the
City?
Recommendation: That Section 612 and 613 of the Charter be
amended to specify that the Council can hold special or
emergency meetings in accordance with procedures established
by law; that meetings shall be held in the Council Chambers
or other locations; meetings shall be open and accessible to
the public; and that the Council shall adopt by ordinance,
rules insuring adequate public notice of and input at its
meetings.
8. Question: Whether City Charter Section 717 relating to a
City Health Officer should be deleted?
Recommendation: The Commission has recommended deletion of
this section.
9. Question: Whether City Charter Section 1515 relating to
claims against the City should be revised to conform to
State law?
Recommendation: That the City Charter refer to the
California Government Code as being the procedural standard
for City action and that Section 1515 be amended to conform
to State law.
10. Question: Whether City Charter Section 608 should be
amended to increase the dollar amount requiring competitive
bidding on public works projects?
Recommendation: That specific dollar limits for competitive
bidding of public works projects be removed from the Charter
and adopted instead by ordinance. Revised Charter wording
has been suggested which states the intent to preserve the
integrity of the bidding process; encourages participation
by disadvantaged or minority persons or businesses in the
bidding process; and includes requirements that consultant
contracts over $50,000 be subject to competitive
requirements.
11. Question: Whether City Charter Section 1300 relating to
official bonds should be amended or deleted?
Recommendation: That provisions relating to official
performance bonds be retained in the Charter but be updated
to remove unnecessary gender specific language and
identification of specific City positions.
12. Question: Whether City Charter Section 1501 relating to
Cash Basis Fund and City Charter Section 1511 relating to
Capital Outlays Fund should be amended or deleted?
Recommendation: That a modification be made to these
sections which preserves the existing powers of the City
Council while simplifying and modernizing charter language
in light of the passage of Proposition 13 and the reduced
reliance of the City on property tax revenues.
13. Question: Whether City Charter Section 1513 relating to the
presentation of demands should be amended or deleted?
Recommendation: Deletion of this section as it is
duplicative of other provisions in the Charter which address
financial management controls and responsibilities.
VOTING RIGHTS QUESTIONS
As an initial step in considering various electoral options, the
Commission wished to inquire into whether the federal Voting
Rights Act compelled any particular choices, or ruled out others.
Accordingly, two consultants were engaged to investigate aspects
of this question. Historian J. Morgan Kousser of the California
Institute of Technology was asked to look at the historical
record to determine whether there was persuasive evidence, under
the Voting Rights Act or on other grounds, that Santa Monica had
a discrimination problem. Urban Planning Professor Leo Estrada,
of UCLA, was asked to study whether (assuming that there might
well be a voting discrimination problem) there was a legal remedy
for it through a change in electoral arrangements.
The answers to both questions are less than conclusive. Dr.
Kousser's research, based largely on newspaper coverage of
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the 1946 Charter (and
its maintenance in 1975 over a proposed district-oriented
revision), and on statistical analysis showing high correlational
association between supporters of Charter adoption and opponents
of fair employment legislation, offers substantial evidence that
the current Charter was, from a voting discrimination point of
view, suspect.
The material Dr. Kousser examined, though it contains no direct
evidence of discriminatory intent by the Charter's framers
themselves, is in Dr. Kousser's view, sufficient basis for a
prima facie case, and one which he maintains "would have to be
defended vigorously."
Dr. Kousser added, that the evidence of discriminatory intent in
the adoption of the 1946 Charter was at least as strong as in the
successful redistricting case against the Los Angeles County
Board of Supervisors, in which he served as principal expert
witness on the intent issue.
However, the scope of Dr. Kousser's research was limited to
approximately 70 hours, he was not asked to explore contrary
evidence, and he characterized his conclusions as "quite
tentative."
In the view of the City Attorney's Office, the evidence presented
is no "smoking gun", and does not provide the extensive factual
record that would be required to prove intent in a case of this
kind. Even if the Commission were to make the worst case
assumption on the intent issue, the City Attorney's Office
explained, several other pre-conditions would need to be met in
order for a voting discrimination suit to be seriously
considered. The other elements of a successful suit are: a) that
such discriminatory intent was actually translated into a
discriminatory effects; and b) that there is a viable remedy for
the problem. Specifically, plaintiffs would also need to
establish: 1) the existence of a minority group sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district; 2) that the minority group is politically
cohesive, and 3) that its preferred candidate(s) are usually
defeated by votes of the white majority.
On these points, all of which need to be answered affirmatively
for an adverse voting discrimination judgment to be found, we
have at this point no clear affirmative answers (though it has
been established by Professor Estrada's work that combined ethnic
minorities constitute a majority of a compact district). The
Commission did not pursue answers to the second and third points.
For the Commission's decision-making process, it was unneccessary
to determine these answers because the Commission was already
committed to recommending a system that would increase ethnic
empowerment.
Since the Commission was nearing consensus on proposing
abandonment of the at-large system for that and other policy
reasons, the legal consequences of remaining at-large were
becoming moot points, for our deliberative process.
In the further choice between districts and the single
transferable vote, both of which are large steps toward greater
ethnic group electoral influence, the relevance of the answers is
marginal. The degree of group cohesiveness will bear on a
minority group's success rate under both systems, and, short of
virtual unanimity, provides no iron-clad guarantee of success
under either one. A mathematically sophisticated examination
comparing the probable success rates under districts or STV of
ethnic-backed candidates is a project that can be done, and
perhaps should be done before a final decision is made. It was
not a project, however, that could be done within the time frame
and budget of this report, or with the staff available to the
Commission.
Similarly, counter-voting by the white majority, if it
exists,(and no evidence of its current existence has been put
before us) would impinge on ethnic choices succeeding under
either system. If there is any significant degree of such
counter-voting it might be more effective in districts than under
STV. This is also a matter that could well be pursued further,
but not one we were able to pursue within our time, skill and
budget constraints.
What is clear, in contrast to all these unanswered questions, is
that STV, like districts, brings Hispanics much closer to placing
their choice on city council. Unlike districts, it avoids a
forced choice between a Hispanic and African-American candidate,
and enables all members of each group, regardless of place of
residence, to unify behind a candidate of its preference - or for
that matter, to join together. As such, it is hard to foresee a
basis under which it could be attacked as minority vote dilution.
Likewise, should the Council choose to follow our second
preference and institute districts, the City should, provided it
drew a district that nearly maximized minority voter strength, be
immune to voting rights litigation.
As the Commission on policy grounds recommends discontinuance of
the at-large plurality system,we hesitate to step into the shoes
of the City Attorney to advise Council on its voting rights risk
exposure should it not abolish at-large elections.
There is of course no pending voting discrimination litigation,
nor threat of litigation, nor even rumor of a threat.
However, we have heard enough discussion and read enough material
related to the question that we can say as a matter of prudent
management, that it would be unfortunate and unwise to maintain
in place a system the City might need to defend at great expense,
notwithstanding the likelihood that the City might ultimately
prevail.
By contrast, in the City Attorney's view a move to a system that
offered increased opportunity for minority representation would
be a defense to any such suit. This, in our view, is yet one
more reason - not the most important one, but a significant one
- for choosing one of the electoral options we have recommended
in the body of this report.
1) Question: Whether or not the City Charter should be amended
regarding the method of selection of members of the
City Council and Mayor?
FOREWORD
Winston Churchill, irritated at some error of his constituents'
ways, once proclaimed that "democracy is the worst imaginable
form of government - except for any other system that has been
thought of".
As his statement implies, no form of government is without its
drawbacks. Even within an agreed-upon goal of democracy, a
variety of values -- not always compatible -- are bundled.
Democratic values embrace exercise of the will of the majority,
while at the same time protecting the rights of the minority.
Responsiveness to changes in public opinion is a goal, but so is
policy continuity and stability.
In the issue of applied democracy the Commission deals with here
- the question of electoral systems - we are likewise faced with
the task of clarifying our values and objectives; and weighing
carefully each system in terms of its ability to express those
values.
We have tried, through our deliberations, and in this report, to
assess the assets and liabilities of various electoral options
and draw a balanced judgment, realizing throughout that there is
no perfect machinery for the translation of the popular will, no
ultimately "right answer" to this problem. We hope, however,
that the following is helpful in indicating why some systems are
more imperfect than others, and why we decided finally, to
recommend the option that we chose.
PROCESS
The Commission began its deliberative process on the electoral
system question in July with a panel including Rick Cole,
Councilmember elected from a district in Pasadena; Santa Monica's
Councilmember Herb Katz, an opponent of districting; Peter
Morrison, RAND demographer; and Paul de Santis, a local attorney
and district advocate. A further evening of discussion featured
Richard Fajardo, a staff attorney for the Mexican-American Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) who has been active in many
voting rights cases, (including the Garza case, which brought
about adoption of a Latino seat on the Los Angeles County Board
of Supervisors). Also appearing were members of CURE, Santa
Monica's election reform advocacy group, including Irene Zivi;
Commission members Steve Alpert and Herman Rosenstein; Pico
resident Doug Willis (who later joined the Commission), and Norm
Curry of the Santa Monica NAACP.
During this same period, the Commission spent several sessions
identifying the virtues and liabilities of the current at-large
system as well as key objectives to be met by any eventual
recommended electoral system. We delved into numerous articles
and book chapters from public affairs magazines and political
science research that offered a variety of perspectives on the
procedures involved in, and the impact of all types of electoral
systems. A substantial part of this material focussed on ethnic
representation questions.
Dr. Bernard Grofman of U. C. Irvine, noted expert and editor of
several books on electoral systems joined us in October. While
introducing us to the fundamentals of more uncommon proportional
representation options, he advised us to avoid an abstract search
for the theoretically perfect system. Instead, he suggested we
focus on determining what changes are desirable in Santa Monica's
political culture, and then select a system to facilitate these
goals.
A visit from long-time Long Beach City Councilmember Tom Clark,
who served in both at-large and district systems, added another
look at the pros and cons of these alternatives.
In a public hearing at the beginning of February we briefly
outlined the mechanics of and rationale for the various electoral
options, and received a number of useful opinions from community
members.
A presentation by UCLA Urban Planning Professor Leo Estrada on
his demographic research gave us a concrete model of districting
for minority representation. The March report of Cal Tech
historian Morgan Kousser contended that the current at-large
system had been no ally of minority empowerment.
We decided on a two-stage process for making our final decision,
the first matter at issue being whether to recommend a change
from the status quo. The Commission almost unanimously (14 to 1)
recommended doing so. The Commission then undertook an exercise
to determine preferences among various electoral system options.
CONCLUSIONS
In our near-consensus for recommending a shift from the at-large
plurality system currently in use, we were guided in large part
by a desire to distribute empowerment more broadly in Santa
Monica, particularly to ethnic groups but to neighborhoods and
issue groups as well. A move away from the current system, we
believe, should enhance the responsiveness of representatives and
make the electoral process more open to new ideas and new
participants.
In selecting a substitute for the present process, the Commission
was drawn to aspects of both the proportional method and to
district elections. After several sessions devoted primarily to
a thorough discussion of their relative merits, eight
Commissioners selected the proportional approach as their first
preference. Five Commissioners selected districts as first
preference. Districts were selected as second preference by four
Commissioners as was a mixed district/at-large system.
Proportional was selected as a second choice by two
Commissioners. Retaining the current at-large system was the
first preference of one Commissioner and the second choice of one
other Commissioner.
At the end of its deliberations, the Commission voted to
recommend that if City Council decides not to propose a
proportional method to the voters, then both the district system
and a hybrid district/at-large system should be seriously
considered. It was further recommended by a majority of
Commissioners that if a district form were adopted, there should
only be one election, rather than a primary followed by a
run-off.
The districting approach has many attractive aspects: the
restoration of face-to-face campaigning involved promises to
dispel some of the alienation of contemporary political
discourse, and diminish the corrupting influence of special
interest campaign funding. Districting undoubtedly has
empowering aspects as well.
What weighed heavily against its several virtues, in many of the
Commissioners' minds, was its single disempowering side: that
every voter would lose much influence over six of seven council
members. The majority of the Commission believed this was an
unacceptable trade-off for whatever enhanced influence and
accountability would be produced over one member. Also reducing
the voters' power, some Commissioners thought, was that in this
system, one could vote only every four years.
Districts certainly help geographically concentrated communities
of interest; but for many Santa Monicans, the group with which we
identify is not geographically defined. We noted, for example,
the gender imbalance on City Council, and suggest that if women
wanted to aggregate their support for a candidate, it would be
difficult for them to do so through a district format.
Most members of the Commission see, in a proportional voting
system (particularly the single transferable vote method), a
solution that offers the empowerment opportunities of the
district method without its major liability. While it may not go
as far in reducing the impact of campaign contributions, it
offers many of the other dividends of districting.
In our view, proportional representation's primary virtue is its
flexibility, an aid to accurately reflecting popular priorities.
If neighborhood issues are at the top of the public mind,
district-based candidacies will be strong; if feminist or
development issues rise to prominence, feminist or
development-oriented candidacies can flourish; when ethnic groups
have an urgent agenda, ethnic candidacies will no doubt do well.
By lowering the threshold of votes needed for electoral success,
adoption of a proportional method will open the system to more
pluralistic representation; by its flexibility, it will allow the
public to determine from time to time, as priorities change, the
specific content of that pluralism.
The downside of a proportional system is its complexity, which
would necessitate a thorough public education campaign prior to
being put forward as an option for voter consideration.
VOTES NEEDED TO ELECT UNDER VARIOUS SYSTEMS
THEORETICAL MINIMUM MINIMUM VOTE SHARE
SHARE TO ELECT UNDER REQUIRED TO ELECT
BEST CASE ASSUMPTIONS BASED ON EMPIRICAL
EXPERIENCE
---------------------------------------------------------------
AT-LARGE no theoretical
Plurality minimum 34% - 41%
(current (depends on # of candidates)
system)_______________________________________________________
DISTRICTS none
with (depends on # of candidates 5% - 6% of city
Plurality_____________________________________________voters___
STV 25% when 3 seats up
with same
staggered 20% when 4 seats up
terms_________________________________________________________
STV
with all 12 1/2% (7 seats to fill) same
elected at
once___________________________________________________________
CUMULATIVE 13 - 14% when 3 seats up about 33% if 3 seats
VOTE up
staggered 10% when 4 seats up 25-27% if 4 seats up
terms (assuming each voter has
______________3 and 4 votes, respectively)_____________________
CUMULATIVE 6% if each voter has 7 no data on which to
VOTE votes base estimate
all elected
at once_________________________________________________________
NOTES: 1) based on Santa Monica City Council elections 1986,
'88, '90
2) assuming 7 districts, and similar vote distribution as
in at-large system; i.e. 34 - 41% of electorate within
district
3) highly theoretical assumption that only one candidate
get multiple votes while none of opponents get any
4) assumes (on data from Alamogardo, N. M.) that a
minority-backed candidate gets approximately 2 votes
from average supporter, while other candidates get
approximately 1 1/2 votes per supporter
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Most members of the Commission felt that we were making our
decision with less information than we would have liked to have
had before us, and several Commissioners would have preferred to
investigate several questions before making our recommendation,
but the time frame in which we were charged with completing our
report made that impossible.
We strongly suggest that City Council take steps to determine
several unsettled issues before making its final decision,
utilizing experts in this area as needed. These matters include:
o While our limited investigation of proportional vote
counting systems led us to believe that a fair and reliable
procedure can be designed (which prevents election outcomes
from being skewed by the order of ballot counting) further
development of its application and exploration of possible
pitfalls is still needed. The so-called "Boulder system"
of transferring surplus ballots avoids the theoretical
possibility of close elections being determined by the
order of ballot count, but we know of no jurisdictions
where this system is in actual use. The costs of
proportional election tabulation, both computer conversion
and ongoing expense, require more thorough investigation,
although our cursory research suggested neither cost would
be prohibitive. A computer program for the counting of
transferred votes according to the Boulder system could no
doubt be devised fairly easily. Whether another unbiased
method could be developed is a question that could be
explored further.
o Latino voting strength in Santa Monica: what proportion
of voters in the proposed minority-influence district are
actually members of minorities? And what proportion of the
unregistered population can we estimate to be non-citizens?
Resolving this question is important to assessing whether
we have been correct in our tentative conclusion that a
proportional system will work as well for Latino influence
on City Council as a district would.
o Political culture under a proportional system: is it
empirically the case that independent candidacies have a
greater rate of success than they do in districts; are
slates an important presence in proportional elections?
o Further research on the role of campaign spending under
proportional and district systems: are top spenders, in
fact, less likely to win under those systems than under
at-large systems?
OBJECTIVES AND VALUES
In considering various options for Santa Monica's City Council
electoral system, the objectives considered by the Commission to
be primary were:
o to guarantee accountability, so that over the long term
Council members faithfully reflect popular preferences in
their policy-making.
o to preserve accessibility, so that over the short run Council
members are responsive to day-to-day needs of their
constituents.
o to ensure that governing bodies reflect the ethnic diversity
of Santa Monica so that no group is deprived of an
opportunity to make its voice heard and its choices known.
o to facilitate the representation of the diverse currents of
opinion in Santa Monica, and assure a place on the public
agenda for the varied priorities of many organizations and
all neighborhoods.
o to maintain, while broadening the issue agenda to an array of
individual and group concerns, the centrality of common
concerns, and assure that Council members approach problems
with the interest of the whole City foremost in their minds.
o to encourage the widest possible voter participation.
o to equalize, as far as possible, the influence of all
residents, as articulated in the principle 'one person, one
vote' by minimizing the distorting influence of campaign
money on the democratic process.
o and to provide every resident not only equal representation,
but an equal right to be a representative by maximizing the
opportunity for independent candidates to compete
realistically for election.
Accountability and Accessibility
In democratic theory, accountability is the key issue and the
main purpose of having elections of any kind. It is the quid pro
quo of delegation of power to an elected body and the insurance
against that power's misuse.
In practice, accountability is not present/absent but is a matter
of degree. How accountable representatives feel varies according
to individual philosophy and conscience but depends ultimately on
their sense of how easy it would be for discontented constituents
to replace them. The Commission therefore wished to avoid a
system which would tend toward undue entrenchment of
office-holders.
It is also a matter of direction; accountability to whom? The
accountability to all contemplated by political theorists
necessitates approximately equal influence on outcomes by all
citizens. To the Commission, this is linked to the issue of
campaign finance reform, and also to the issue of maximal voter
participation. Voter participation in turn is discouraged by a
narrow agenda of public issues and by a Council membership that
excludes ethnic groups or leaves neighborhoods without
representation. A final dimension of accountability the
Commission considered was how often performance was reviewed.
Many Commissioners felt that biennial elections were desirable
because they allow the voters to signal for change in policy
courses before those courses become irreversible.
In many cities, but not necessarily Santa Monica, much of a
resident's concern with municipal government is service-oriented
rather than issue oriented. Potholes, streetlights, traffic,
crime-- matters on which a resident wants prompt action and a
simple way to get it. Many City Councilmembers may not see
themselves primarily in the role of ombudspersons or service
representatives, but it is a facet of the role and in some
residents' eyes, the central one. The issue of accessibility can
be viewed several ways. Does the voter with their own local
Councilmember get more attention and better service? Will he/she
have a better sense of a local problem and be more concerned
about it? Or is it preferable to have a number of
representatives, and multiply the points of access for influence?
On balance the Commission leaned toward the latter point of view,
in part because the geographical proximity of a Councilmember was
not a guarantee of either shared concerns or personal
compatibility.
Ethnic Diversity
Demographic trends, rising cultural sensitivity to
multiculturalism, maturing minority political consciousness and
federal voting rights legislation are all impelling more serious
consideration of the need for multi-ethnic representation on
America's governing bodies. In Santa Monica's particular case,
the size and distribution of ethnic groups in the City does not
make the best route to this goal obvious.
While it would be possible to form one district with a voting age
majority of (multiple) minorities, it is not clear whether they
would be a majority of actual voters. Nor is it clearly the most
empowering option to insure minority influence in Santa Monica's
political life. Since multiple minorities are involved, would
one group's gain be another's loss? Or would common interests
facilitate coalition? Would minorities residing outside such a
district be empowered or disempowered (gain or lose influence) by
its creation? We were not able to come to a conclusion on these
questions.
Neighborhood Empowerment And Voter Participation
For many city dwellers, conditions in their immediate area are
perhaps the foremost concern in thinking about politics, and the
quality of neighborhood life is the yardstick by which they
evaluate local government. Neighborhood activism is alive and
well in Santa Monica and we wish to encourage it to thrive, for
the solutions to many problems, even those affecting the whole
City, may first be developed in the incubator of intense
neighborhood interactions.
But not all of Santa Monica neighborhoods seem to feel equally
treated, or equally empowered. There are considerable
differences between various districts in their voter turnouts.
It is no coincidence that the area of lowest turnout (Pico
neighborhood) is also the area feeling most disenfranchised and
least listened to in City affairs. One cannot point to cause and
effect here, but a cycle: those who participate less may get
less consideration when decisions are made; those who feel they
and their neighbors have no influence will in turn be disinclined
to bother participating.
In the Commission's opinion, neighborhood activism is a vital
element in civic life, and we believe the City's electoral system
should be one that reinforces it where it is healthy and
stimulates it where it is frail.
A system that gives all neighborhoods reason to feel their
concerns will get attention should encourage voter participation
in all areas, particularly those low turnout areas that have seen
themselves as neglected neighborhoods.
Reducing Slate Dominance
For some Commission members, one important objective in election
reform would be to reduce the central role of slate politics in
Santa Monica's civic life.
The influence of slates was not seen as lacking positive aspects.
The slating process itself provides a sifting procedure in which
scrutiny by a group of politically interested citizens puts
forward what are presumably the more capable of possible
advocates of that group's point of view. For a variety of people
- supporters and opponents of the endorsing group - such
endorsements can be an economic way of making choices without
investing time in extensive research of candidate records and
positions, a real service to many busy people. Slates were also
given credit for drawing into the political process groups and
individuals who had previously been excluded. Finally, it must
be said that slating organizations with continuing post-election
life can, and perhaps do, by their ongoing interaction with
candidates they sponsored, provide a form of public
accountability between elections.
However, these benefits, in many Commissioners' opinion, are
outweighed by serious liabilities. The pre-eminent place of
slates in Santa Monica's political process reduces the prospects
for independent candidates to get the public's attention,
regardless of their individual merits.
It is in the nature of slate campaigns, many Commissioners
believe, to revolve around a very few issues. This is, to some
extent, an affliction of all contemporary media-oriented
electoral campaigns, but is exacerbated in the case of slates
because of the need to play down issues on which endorsed
candidates do not agree. The narrowing of the issue agenda in
the campaign, we believe, has a carry-over effect into
week-to-week city government; with attention focussed so brightly
on the "main issues" over which the vote polarized, other equally
important issues tend to be eclipsed.
For many residents, the principal campaign themes may be matters
of relative indifference, compared to other issues they feel
strongly about. The Commission feels that slate campaigns are in
part responsible for the difficulty of developing ongoing civic
dialogue on a broader range of topics.
No system we considered would eliminate slate influence, nor
would we consider that a desirable goal. We would, however, hope
to see the adoption of a system in which slate endorsement was
merely one factor, and not the key consideration, in a
candidate's prospects for success.
AT-LARGE ELECTIONS
Mechanics and Usage: The at-large system of City Council
election has been in force in Santa Monica since the present
Charter was adopted, and the three City Commissioners (for public
works, public safety and finance) were elected at-large before
that. As members of the present City Council were elected under
this system, we need not expound here on its mechanics, but only
note that within the genre, there are variations such as majority
vote requirements (with primary and run-off if needed), and the
numbered seat system.
In California cities, use of the at-large option is the norm, and
has been for most cities since their inception. Of 220
California cities surveyed by the League of California Cities in
1989, 205 employed it in contrast to 15 choosing members by
district.
Districts tend to be predominant in the State's largest cities -
Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Long Beach -- although
districts can be found in a number of cities of Santa Monica's
approximate size -- Redondo Beach, Downey and Pasadena.
Across the nation, too, at-large elections prevail, except in
metropolitan centers. Yet, this was not always true.
At the end of the 19th century, district (or ward) election was
the rule in United States cities, only to be swept away as part
of the municipal reform movement package of changes, which also
entailed non-partisan elections and the city manager form of
government.
The upheaval in municipal governance brought about by the reform
movement was prompted in part, by, and aimed in part at,
wide-spread graft and corruption in city politics. However, the
reforms introduced (especially the abolition of district
election), whatever they accomplished in expunging political
rackets, had the consequence of disempowering ethnic minorities
and the residents of poorer neighborhoods. To what extent this
was a goal of some reformers, or merely a by-product, remains a
lively debate among historians, one we need not explore here.
The disempowering effect, nonetheless, has been a recurring issue
since the institution of at-large systems, here and elsewhere.
As late as 1941, the National Municipal League advocated at-large
elections in its Model City Charter, explaining: "It is difficult
to find capable leaders distributed throughout the city by
wards."
As our consulting historian, Professor J. Morgan Kousser,
reported to us, the adoption of Santa Monica's current Charter
involved a spirited controversy between district proponents
(including African American leaders and residents of Ocean Park)
and advocates of at-large, led by the almost all North-of-Montana
"freeholders" who designed the Charter.
Complaints from the Pico and Ocean Park areas were rebuffed by
the Board of Freeholders, who first agreed and then declined to
put a district option on the ballot, and dismissed by the Santa
Monica Outlook, which editorialized that the "interest of
minorities is always best protected by a system which favors the
election of liberal-minded persons who are not compelled to play
peanut politics."
Dissenters raised the prospect of a North-of-Montana
"dictatorship" with little concern for "the resident of Ocean
Park, Douglas district, or Lincoln-Pico" and asked "Where will
the Jewish, colored or Mexican go for aid in his special
problems?"
But the Charterites prevailed at the polls (though more narrowly
in the above-mentioned areas), and the controversy did not
resurface until 1974, when Ocean Park residents spearheaded an
initiative for a 7-district plan, collecting 10,000 signatures.
Again opposed by the Outlook, incumbent office-holders and the
Chamber of Commerce, the pro-district forces - backed by the
League of Women Voters and Democratic Clubs (according to Outlook
records) - lost the April 1975 vote carrying Ocean Park precincts
but little else in a two-to-one defeat.
The issue of minority empowerment (generally in the context of
ethnicity rather than class or neighborhoods as such) has been
raised repeatedly throughout our state and nation in the 1970's
and 1980's and opposition to the at-large method on those grounds
has weakened its sway. Under Voting Rights Act litigation, or
the threat thereof, many southern cities were pressed to abandon
the at-large system, usually in favor of district elections or a
hybrid arrangement combining districts with some members
at-large. Some California cities, usually without legal
pressure, made the same changes in response to both ethnic and
neighborhood pressures to choose their own spokespersons.
Appraisal: One major advantage of an at-large Council, the
Commission felt, was accessibility. With responsibility to all
voters comes an openness to the needs of all Santa Monicans and
some incentive to be informed on issues and developments all over
the City. We feel that Santa Monica's size makes this a
realistic expectation.
Some members of the Commission feared that without at-large
constituencies, Council members would have little motivation to
meet the needs and concerns of people outside their immediate
geographic areas.
The Commission evaluated the at-large system as least desirable
on the criterion of accountability. Two facets of the system
diminish a council member's vulnerability to removal. The only
way to bring about the defeat of one member who has been
unresponsive is by ensuring that three (or four) other candidates
get more votes. This was felt to be an indirect, difficult and
inefficient route to removing the unaccountable.
Exacerbating the problem is the expense of at-large elections
necessarily associated with reaching the numbers of voters needed
to win in this system. That sizable amounts of funds generally
flow to incumbents just by virtue of their incumbency is one
problem. That the dependence on large contributions tends to
make a Councilmember accountable to their donors, rather than the
electorate as a whole, is another and more serious flaw. (It
should be noted that subsequent to the Commission's
deliberations, revisions were made to the Municipal Code relating
to campaign contributions, which may impact this issue in the
future.)
For reasons touched on in the above historical review, and to
which we will return in discussion of districts, the at-large
system is generally considered an obstacle to ethnic empowerment.
Santa Monica's City Council gained its first minority member when
an African-American police officer, Nathaniel Trives, was elected
in 1971, and a second African-American, Hilliard Lawson, was
named by the Council two years later to fill a vacancy opened by
a death in office. Between 1979 and the 1990 election of the
first Latino Councilmember, Antonio Vazquez, minorities had no
presence on the Council.
Santa Monica is fortunate in being relatively free in recent
years of ethnically polarized voting -- as the approval of
minority members by an electorate over 85% white tends to show.
However, the Commission is concerned with a more subtle question
- whether it should be the role of a white electorate to make the
ultimate choice between minority candidates, or for that matter,
between a minority representative and a white competitor. A
minority, elected to office primarily by a white electorate does
not, by that process, become a representative of the minority
community or necessarily a proponent of its agenda.
The central issue, in the Commission's view, is not one of having
Council members who are ethnic, but of empowering ethnic
communities to choose Council members, and on this criterion, the
at-large system is felt to be inadequate. It should be noted
that there was concurrent Commission discussion which addressed
the role and responsibility of slates in promoting (or not
promoting) ethnic minority candidates under the current system.
In this approach to weighing ethnic representation, the
Commission is in accord with the Voting Rights Act and judicial
elaboration thereon, which emphasizes the ability of protected
groups to elect "representatives of their choice", as the
paramount test, above and beyond the ethnic background as such of
the representative.
A second facet of the question of diversity or representativeness
is the ideological dimension. By its nature, the at-large
election tends toward homogeneity of views, rather than
diversity. With a single electorate weighing competing sets of
aligned candidates at the same time, those sharing the same base
and viewpoint would likely all win, or all lose. Only in a close
overall contest would slight variation in individual appeal
produce a mixed result.
A variety of viewpoints on the Council, the Commission believes,
serves not only the popular sense of being represented, but a
decision-making process that avoids error by incorporating
critical perspectives beforehand.
The disempowerment of some neighborhoods is a third dimension of
the diversity issue that concerned the Commission. As noted in
the previous section, there was over-representation from the
North of Montana area -- perceived as "domination" by some -- in
the years following adoption of the present Charter. While
contemporary Councils have been more geographically diverse, some
areas - notably the Pico neighborhood - have never been
represented on City Council. Some residents of that community
expressed to the Commission feelings of neglect and a sense of
disenfranchisement.
The at-large system is not particularly helpful to the placement
of neighborhood issues on the civic agenda since a candidate
oriented mainly to such an issue would have limited appeal
running city-wide. However, should an issue arouse intense
concern in one neighborhood or considerable concern in two or
more, under the at-large system all Council members would have to
listen.
The at-large Council focuses its attention predominantly on
city-wide issues and (if its composition is not skewed by class,
geography, race or some other factor) is designed to make
decisions from the viewpoint of the city's interests as a whole.
That the membership is often skewed, however, can bias the
definition of what the city's interests are.
The simplicity and familiarity of the system makes participation
easy. Only insofar as it may neglect to address the concerns of
some groups for reasons cited above, might it lead to lower voter
interest and hence participation.
DISTRICTS
Mechanics And Usage: Under this system, the City would be
divided into a number of districts of equal population with a
single representive from each district. If the Council were to
remain the same size, Santa Monica would have seven districts,
and one Council member would be elected as Mayor by the Council.
Alternatively, if the mayor were to be elected by the people
city-wide (an option not of particular interest to the
Commission), we might wish to change the number of districts to
six or eight, in order to maintain an odd number (7 or 9) of
votes on Council. A reduction to six districts, however, would
dilute minority influence, perhaps to the point where there was
no "multi-minority majority" district.
Unless the City were to adopt a two-stage election (with a
primary and run-off between top finishers) the district
candidates would be elected by plurality vote.
District boundaries would require revision after each decennial
census. The reapportionment process usually generates friction
among the potential victims or beneficiaries and can be abused to
entrench incumbents through gerrymandering. This task could be
delegated to another body without personal stake in the outcome,
if the Council wishes to reduce controversy and the possibility
of abuse.
It is customary that Councilmembers are required to reside in the
districts they represent, and in practice it would be unusual for
a district to elect a non-resident. Some argue, however, that
the purpose of district elections is to increase neighborhood
empowerment, and that restricting voters' choices to immediate
neighbors is not a necessary part of that process.
We discussed in the previous section the decline and recent
revival of the district method of election and the reasons for
those changes. Districts were in fact briefly used in the first
few years of Santa Monica's civic existence, before the three
Commissioner arrangement was adopted. District advocacy in Santa
Monica has most recently been taken up by CURE (Citizens United
to Reform Elections) which proposed seven districts, most of them
congruent with planning areas or otherwise historically accepted
neighborhoods. The CURE proposal would mandate that representa-
tives reside in their districts. This particular proposal was
also supported by members of local chapters of MALDEF
(Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund) and the NAACP
(National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).
Appraisal: Accountability, the Commission concluded, was
optimized in a districted city -- in a certain sense. Each
Council member has a smaller electorate which will be fairly
aware of his/her performance in office - at least as it pertains
to issues of interest to that neighborhood.
Both logic and anecdotal reports lead to the conclusion that it
would be easier to replace a district representative than to oust
one elected at-large. The limited range of a district campaign
enables new candidates to get adequate exposure more quickly;
similarly, the fewer households one would need to reach could
make campaign funds a lesser factor; human resources -
neighborhood activists - can be substituted. Since in this
milieu the incumbent's funding advantage is less meaningful,
office-holders have more incentive to be attentive to
constituent preferences.
In another sense, accountability is distinctly limited by the
district system; six of seven Councilmembers are beyond the reach
of every individual's vote. While nothing stops anyone from
working for or contributing to an alternative candidate in
another district, the limited number of people likely to do so
makes accountability in this system a parochial one.
A similar trade-off is apparent in accessibility under the
district system. One's local member is likely burdened by fewer
inquiries and requests for services and so has more time for a
constituent's needs but if he/she is inefficient or inattentive,
one has to turn to representatives from other districts who may
be inclined to help, but have no particular incentive to do so.
The information put before the Commission by our consulting
demographer, Professor Leo Estrada of UCLA, suggests a strong
probability, but not clear evidence, that Latinos could determine
the selection of one Council member under a seven-district plan.
Latino influence would be even stronger under a nine-district
format; the Latino voting age population in one district therein
being 44.6% as compared with 39.6% when there are 7 districts.
It was noted that the potential impact of non-citizen Latinos on
voting patterns in Santa Monica is a question that needs to be
determined. If they do, districts may not be the optimum method
of Latino empowerment in this city, because voting Latinos in the
district might be too few to prevail, and Latinos outside the
district would have less influence on the outcome than they do
now.
A further concern to some Commission members was that in the
proposed districts the preponderance of Santa Monica's
African-American population is included to build a multi-minority
majority. But the district sends only one representative to City
Hall, potentially setting the two ethnic groups in head-to-head
competition. Moreover, were competing candidacies to develop, a
third non-minority candidate could well emerge the winner, given
the distribution of ethnic groups.
The district system, for obvious reasons, should guarantee a
place on the public agenda for neighborhood concerns and
problems. Some neighborhoods, we were told by local
spokespersons, feel particularly disenfranchised. One Pico
resident, for example, complained that their area is host to over
three-quarters of homeless and drug-treatment facilities, and is
a "dumping ground" for "all activities incompatible with
residential life." No resident of this district has ever been
elected to City Council.
As interest in, and viewpoints on, such current topics of
controversy as development or rent control vary between
neighborhoods, we believe that a district-based Council would be
more ideologically diverse. The priorities of organizations
might be advanced in such a system if their bases are localized,
but for many groups organized city-wide its adoption would make
no particular difference.
The Commission discussed a point that in maintaining the goal of
a central role for city-wide concerns, the district system could
be counter-productive. Though we want to see neighborhood needs
brought forward, we do not wish to pay a high price in weakening
attention to city-wide perspectives. Some Commissioners feared a
parochialism generating cycle in which representatives would find
it electorally useful to focus on purely local issues, giving
short-shrift to long range city planning, the city's business
climate, or other community-wide considerations.
A district system, in our view, would be among the best choices
in stimulating high voter participation. It maximizes the
likelihood that a candidate - perhaps a friend or neighbor - will
personally be known to the voter; the campaign methods encouraged
by the system facilitate face-to-face contact in any case. Each
voter, in the smaller pond of a district, is more entitled to
feel that his/her croak will make a difference.
The relative ease of reaching the voter base door-to-door has
another positive consequence -- reducing the reliance of
candidates on expensive means of campaign communication, and thus
weaning the political process from donor dependency. (As
mentioned earlier, recently approved changes in local campaign
financing laws may lessen the relative influence of large
campaign contributions in Santa Monica.) Of all the systems we
examined, districts are clearly the optimal approach to this
goal.
The same changes in campaigning styles led us to conclude that
district election would go far toward opening opportunity for
independent candidates. While the reduced budgets needed makes
it easier to mount a campaign, one must still garner a large
proportion of the local vote. Given the substantial influence of
slates, the Commission was not confident that independent
candidacies would succeed more often under districts than under a
proportional representation format, but it is assuredly a more
open system than at-large.
We do not suggest, and have no reason to believe, that slate
politics could not adapt comfortably to the district format;
centralized fund-raising and other co-ordination might well
continue, and slate-endorsed candidates might emerge victorious
in all districts. We do believe, however, that independent
challenges would be more serious than under the present system.
MIXED SYSTEMS
A number of cities have responded to pressures for district
representation by devising a variety of hybrid or mixed district/
at-large combinations. To some observers, such compromises offer
the benefits of both at-large and district methods, while
avoiding the drawbacks of either pure system, i.e., neither areas
deprived of representation nor parochialism. Furthermore, all
citizens under a mixed system have several representatives,
including one who is particularly accessible and accountable to
them.
Hybrid systems are in use in over 1,000 cities nation-wide,
including a majority of those over 250,000 population and a third
of those in Santa Monica's range of 50 to 100 thousand residents.
However, these mixed systems do not enjoy much acceptance in the
Pacific Coast region, where at-large elections are most
prevalent. Several California cities, including Oakland,
Stockton and Downey utilize some at-large and district
combination.
The Commission did not pursue at length an evaluation of the
merits of this approach, in part because it had no strong
advocates in the community. However, the Commission believes
that if Council rejects proportional representation systems, this
option should be given serious consideration as an alternative.
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
Philosophy: Surprising as it may seem to Americans, our method
of electing representatives, by a simple plurality of votes in a
geographical area, is no longer the standard brand of democratic
practice. Indeed, the English-speaking world is among the
minority of the world's democracies in its employment of the
plurality, or "first-past-the-post" system.
For over a century, critics have suggested that this method is
flawed as a way of selecting a governing body. It allows the
largest faction of the population to exclude smaller factions
from any role in governance, creating a deliberative body that
may greatly misrepresent the distribution of views and opinions
among the electorate. In the worst case, 49% of the voters may
emerge from the process with no elected representatives.
The alternatives proposed by these critics are generically termed
"proportional representation", and rest on the philosophical
principle that the composition of governing bodies should closely
mirror the composition (i.e., communities of interest) of the
electing population. The standard against which electoral
schemes are to be judged is one of correspondence between the
proportion of voting support and the proportion of legislators
elected by those supporters.
Underlying this principle and this standard are not only
intuitive notions of "fairness", but pragmatic considerations --
first, that broad popular respect for a governmental process (its
"legitimacy") is enhanced by the widest possible feeling that one
has an advocate for one's views in that process; secondly, that
the opportunity to incorporate some minority perspectives in the
legislative process minimizes the chance of making decisions that
will be ultimately rebuffed by electorate (along with the
decision-makers) come next voting day.
Critics of proportional representation look with alarm at the
system's capacity to spawn numerous small parties or factions,
arguing that this undercuts government's capacity to govern.
That the decision-making process might be slowed by involving
more players can hardly be disputed; whether speedy
decision-making is to be equated with wise decisions is another
matter. A nation at war might be hamstrung by painstaking
coalition-building; it is hard to envision comparable damage to a
city government. Concerns have also been expressed over the
relatively small percentage of votes needed for election to a
seat.
Although there are no examples of proportional representation
electoral systems among California municipalities, there are
models of this approach elsewhere in the United States.
SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
Mechanics and Usage: Among the many methodologies proposed to
allow a gradation of voter preferences among candidates, the
single transferable vote (STV) is one of mostly widely known, and
one suited to municipal non-partisan elections. (Many other
methods presume the existence of political parties, or a
legislative body of flexible size.)
In STV, the voter marks his/her ballot ranking all (or some)
candidates by preference (first choice "1", second choice "2",
etc.), and a candidate is elected upon attaining a threshold
(called "quota") of n + 1 + 1 votes, where n is the number of
seats to be filled -- if four seats are open, one-fifth of the
votes plus one suffices; with seven council members to be
elected, one-eighth plus one.
A first count looks only at each ballot's first preferences, and
this round usually produces some winners, sometimes all of them.
Where seats remain to be filled after the first count, transfers
-- of second preferences -- come into play. These are taken from
two classes of ballots that would otherwise be "wasted" votes --
those with a first preference for the candidate with the least
votes, and the extra or "surplus" votes of a candidate (if any)
already elected in the first round.
Under the normal rules of plurality election both kinds of
ballots would be "dead" or ineffectual. In STV, the voters who
cast them are re-enfranchised by bringing their second
preferences to bear on the choice between the remaining
contenders.
STV systems enjoyed some popularity in municipal voting early in
this century, in numerous Eastern cities including Cleveland and
Cincinnati. Most jurisdictions have since abandoned them, but
commentators have attributed this to the pressure of partisan
politicians, rather than to grass-roots dissatisfaction. Used
briefly for selecting New York City's Council, its abandonment in
1947 gave Democrats 24 of 25 council seats in the following
election, though that party's vote was just 52.5 percent.
Cambridge, Massachusetts continues to use STV to select its City
Council and School Committee. New York City employs it for
selecting its numerous community school boards, though a State
Senate committee recently proposed reverting to a plurality
system.
Appraisal: While we believe that the STV system, when utilized
by an informed electorate, can be the most effective method of
approaching the goals we identified as desirable in an electoral
system, many Commissioners nonetheless harbor serious doubts
about its practicality.
The complexity of the counting procedure as well as possible
(under some methodologies) influence of the order of counting
makes it difficult for most voters to understand the effects of
their second and later ballot preferences. While it is fairly
straightforward to choose one's three or more favored candidates,
strategic decisions about how to rank them if some are considered
more likely to win than others would be difficult to calculate.
The rationale for the counting system, like its mechanics, is not
easily explained.
Many Commissioners believe that with a thorough informational
campaign, Santa Monica voters will readily see the system's
benefits and embrace it, despite its unfamiliar character.The
Commission's exposure to public response (at our February forum)
suggested, however, that public education and acceptance might be
more of a challenge than we had imagined.
The objectives of ethnic group empowerment and ideological
diversity should be greatly advanced by a change to the single
transferable vote method of Council election, provided that all
Council members were elected at the same time. The joint effect
of these adjustments would be to reduce the proportion of voter
support needed to win to about one-third of its present level.
In the 1990 election, 37% support (about three-eighths) produced
a victory; under STV with 7 seats open, one-eighth support would
be "quota", a sufficient number to win.
One can imagine a number of issues around which an eighth of
Santa Monica's electorate might be rallied. One could also
foresee campaigns arising around neighborhood bases, especially
in any area that has hitherto felt a lack of representation.
Santa Monica's Latino population, estimated to comprise about
one-seventh of the city's voting age population, probably makes
up a large enough base for a successful candidacy -- even
allowing for a substantial number of non-citizens -- when the
winner needs only 12 1/2 percent of the vote.
Were staggered terms to be maintained, on the other hand, the
expected benefit to ethnic or issue-oriented groups dwindles
significantly. The threshold of representation becomes 25% when
three seats are open, 20% when four seats are up. The hurdle
would unquestionably be lowered from its current 37% level, but
it may yet remain impractically high for many groups.
Whether STV is more group-empowering than the cumulative vote
(discussed in the next section), or more so than a district
system, revolves in large part then around the question of how
many Councilmembers are chosen at the same time.
As the STV system, would, we assume, be used in the context of a
city-wide electorate, no absolute reduction in campaign spending
can be expected. However, to the degree that the size of the
voter base needed becomes smaller, the amount of money needed to
mount a serious campaign may shrink accordingly, as long as the
base of candidate support can be identified effectively.
An increase in independent candidacies of all kinds would be a
logical consequence of STV, as would-be Councilmembers
contemplate the lower hurdle to elective office. The first
proportional representation vote in Worcester, Mass. in 1949
brought out 152 candidates for 9 seats.
Whether independents meet with success, thereby weakening the
central role of slate politics, is not so predictable, although
we may safely say the probability is greater than under the
current voting structure. A host of independent candidates,
without agreements to support one another with second
preferences, might do as much to undermine each other as to
weaken slates.
Slating groups could survive in this electoral regime, but would
need to lower their objectives in terms of the number of seats
controlled. Attempts to spread the group's support between many
candidates could produce defeat for all of them.
New electoral coalitions would be likely to develop on an ad hoc
basis as public interest rose around emerging issues.
A City Councilmember elected under STV could look at any voter in
the city as a potential source of support - or opposition. In
this sense, STV can make for a responsive and accountable
Council. At the same time, a broad base of support is not
essential to success under this system; consequently, there is
somewhat less incentive to respond to all constituents,
especially if Councilmembers see their election as resting on a
specific geographic, ethnic or issue base.
While we have emphasized the benefits of STV in facilitating
representation for minorities of all types, we recognize that the
Council may need to weigh against it the philosophical
counter-arguments ('majority rule') central to democratic
tradition, and also the policy consideration of stimulating and
rewarding single-issue candidacies.
STV, like the cumulative vote, affords the possibility of
informal district representation for any large area where
residents' common concerns are high on their political agendas.
Of all systems we considered, STV, despite its complexity, may do
the most to stimulate voter participation. The relative ease,
compared to the current system, of gaining a spokesperson on City
Council, under this method, brings rewards within reach of
grass-roots groups of many persuasions who may presently feel
political participation to be a fruitless effort.
CUMULATIVE VOTING
Mechanics and Usage: An option sometimes described as a
semi-proportional voting method is the cumulative vote. While
not truly proportional in its outcome, it tends to produce more
proportional results than do plurality systems.
The cumulative system may be used in any contest where more than
one representative is to be elected. It gives the voter as many
votes as there are winners but allows them to be cast in a number
of ways, depending on whether the voter wishes to focus, or to
distribute, his/her support.
Where, for example, three Councilmembers are to be elected, a
voter may cast one vote for each of three candidates, or all
three votes for a single choice.
The latter course would be taken when there is an intense
interest in getting one particular person elected; or perhaps
just indifference or indecision about the relative merits of the
other candidates.
Between that strategy and the traditional one vote each for three
candidates, lies still another option; two votes for a first
choice and one vote for a second. Sometimes, half-votes are
employed to permit an equal weighting (1 1/2 votes) for two
preferred choices.
The method allows voters to express the strength of their desire
for the election of one candidate (or two-less intensely), rather
than restricting them to simple choice of "for" or "against".
Voters who see no reason to prefer candidates B or C over D or E
can put votes to use under this system that would otherwise be
"wasted".
The purpose of such a system is to ensure some representation to
a substantial minority bloc who might otherwise be "shut out".
It is in common use in American corporate life for electing
boards of directors, enabling minority stockholders to have a
voice on the board.
In American politics, it has played a marginal role. The State
of Illinois, sectionally polarized by conflicting Civil War
loyalties, instituted cumulative voting for members of its House
of Representatives in 1870, with three-member districts. In
practice, this process usually allowed the minority party in the
area to gain one-third representation, since it would take 75% or
more support to sweep all three seats. Despite the technically
complicated ballot, the system remained in place for a full
century, being abolished in 1980 by referendum in conjunction
with greatly reducing the size of the Illinois House. Opinions
are divided as to whether the vote was primarily against the
voting system, or against a pay raise the Legislature had just
voted for itself.
The cumulative system was revived for use in 1987 through a
court-approved settlement of a voting rights lawsuit in
Alamogordo, New Mexico. This city of about 25,000 subsequently
elected a Latino to its City Council. It had been 19 years since
Latinos, who constitute just under 25% of the population, had
been able to elect one of their number to the City Council.
Field research by political scientists Richard Cole, Delbert
Taebel and Richard Engstrom, employing exit polls on Election
Day, established that the multiple votes of Latinos did indeed
provide the margin of victory for the Latino winner. Although
fourth in the number of voters who supported her, she was third
in number of votes.
The exit poll also indicated that 95% of the voters understood
the system, and that over two-thirds had cast multiple votes for
a candidate. The City spent about $4,000 on programs to
publicize the system, through meetings and explanatory
literature. No voting strategy aimed at blocking a minority
candidate was apparent in the voting results.
Appraisal: With regard to the goals of empowering ethnic
minorities and contributing to ideological diversity, the
Commission believes this method would be a substantial step
forward. The ability to aggregate several votes for a candidate
permits a smaller group to reach the threshold of representation.
Based on Santa Monica's most recent election, that threshold, the
proportion of voters needed to elect the lowest-tallying winner,
is approximately three-eighths (37%).
Had cumulative voting been utilized to its maximum potential by
an ethnic or an issue-oriented group comprising one-eighth of the
voters, that group could theoretically have elected one candidate
of its choice. This model assumes that no multiple votes are
cast for the other candidates and so, like the assumption that
all supporters cast all their votes one way, indicates only its
theoretical potential. But in practice, cumulative voting should
give a committed base of under 20% a fair chance to elect a
spokesperson in a 3-opening race, and a very good chance in a
four-person race.
Since no ethnic minority approaches 20% of Santa Monica's
electorate, this method, while an improvement over the at-large
system, presents less opportunity for a minority to elect its
choice of candidate than would a district system.
The minority-empowering impact of this method would be greatly
enhanced if it were combined with an end to staggered terms. In
a seven-way race, allowing each voter seven votes, a united
committed base of as little as 6% of the electorate would be
theoretically sufficient to elect, assuming (as above) no
multiple votes for other candidates - an unrealistic assumption.
But, in practice, a base of about twice that size should be
enough to place one candidate in office.
Insofar as the voter base of a candidacy could be geographical,
rather than ethnic or issue-oriented, cumulative voting might
enhance neighborhood empowerment as well.
Because the number of voters required for a successful race is
considerably reduced, the campaign spending per candidate may be
proportionately diminished, even though the unit of election
continues to be the city as a whole. A campaign focussed on a
geographic area or an ethnic group can be mounted at a much lower
cost than an appeal to the whole electorate. In the case of
issue-oriented groups the cost reduction is more questionable; if
the issue in question is linked to an organization, or the cause
has other ways of identifying its supporters amongst the ranks of
the electorate, the same economies apply. For a new issue, or
one without organizational linkage, savings might be more
marginal. Under this system, with a smaller base of supporters
needed to gain election, the independent candidate's prospects
improve, and to that degree the power of slating groups is
eroded. However, slates aiming at filling fewer posts than were
open could under this system coordinate their supporters to cast
multiple votes for two or more candidates.
Since all voters continue to be eligible to vote for all
candidates, a Councilmember hoping for re-election would be wise
to be accessible to all Santa Monicans, but to the degree that a
narrower electoral base is sufficient under this system, it
provides somewhat less incentive to accessibility than the
at-large system.
For the same reason, it is possible that neighborhood issues
might be emphasized over city-wide problems, since one electoral
strategy might be mobilization against city neglect of a
neighborhood. In this sense, cumulative voting could (as could
the single transferable vote) result in district representation
without district elections.
The impact on voter participation, we conjecture, should be
positive, as groups of various kinds unable to contend for
control of City Council can, with this device of multiple votes,
realistically contemplate representation. There is no indication
that the novel aspects of the ballot pose complexities that
confuse the voters or reduce participation.
VOTING RIGHTS QUESTIONS
As an initial step in considering various electoral options, the
Commission wished to inquire into whether a legitimate claim of
violation of the federal Voting Rights Act could be made against
the City. Ultimately, two consultants were engaged to
investigate aspects of this question. Professor J. Morgan
Kousser of the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
examined portions of Santa Monica's history to determine whether
there is evidence that the current City Charter was adopted or
maintained so as to disenfranchise minority residents. UCLA
Professor Leo Estrada studied the City's minority population
distribution to determine whether it was possible to create a
district that could elect a minority City Councilmember.
As a result of time constraints, Dr. Kousser's research was
limited and was largely based on newspaper coverage of
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the 1946 Charter and a
1975 proposal to create districts. In addition, he conducted a
statistical analysis to determine whether 1946 voting records
revealed racially polarized voting between supporters and
opponents of the Charter.
In Dr. Kousser's view, the initial evidence of discrimination is
sufficiently strong so that the City would have to defend itself
vigorously in order to overcome a claimed violation of the Voting
Rights Act.
Dr. Kousser added that the evidence of discriminatory intent in
the adoption of the 1946 Charter was at least as strong as in
successful voting rights cases in which he has served as the
principal expert witness.
However, the scope of Dr. Kousser's research was limited to
approximately 70 hours, he was not asked to explore contrary
evidence, and he characterized his conclusions as "quite
tentative."
For his part, Professor Estrada determined that it was possible
to create a minority district within the framework of a seven-
district City Council. Such a district would largely encompass
what is generally regarded as the Pico Neighborhood with a near
majority of voters being Latino. Combined Latino and African
Americans would constitute a majority of voters in this district.
Professor Estrada concluded that this district was sufficiently
compact to satisfy Voting Rights Act criteria.
The City Attorney's office noted that the evidence presented must
be viewed in context, must be considered as tentative, and does
not compel a particular result. Even if the Commission were to
make the worst case assumption on the intent issue, the City
Attorney's office explained, several other preconditions would
need to be met in order for a voting discrimination suit to be
seriously considered. Specifically, any plaintiff would also
need to establish: (1) the existence of a minority group
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single member district; (2) that the minority group
is politically cohesive, and (3) that its preferred candidates
are usually defeated by votes of the white majority.
On these points, all of which need to be answered affirmatively
for an adverse voting discrimination judgment to occur, we have
at this point no clear affirmative answers (though it has been
established by Professor Estrada's work that combined ethnic
minorities constitute a majority of a compact district). The
Commission did not pursue answers to the second and third points.
For the Commission's decision-making process, it was unnecessary
to determine these answers because the Commission was already
committed to recommending a system that would increase ethnic
empowerment. Since the Commission was nearing consensus on
proposing abandonment of the at-large system for that and other
policy reasons, the legal consequences of remaining at-large were
becoming moot points, for our deliberative process.
In the further choice between districts and a proportional
representation plan (such as STV), both of which are large steps
toward greater ethnic group electoral influence, the relevance of
the answers is marginal. The degree of group cohesiveness will
bear on a minority group's success rate under both systems, and,
short of virtual unanimity, provides no iron-clad guarantee of
success under either one. A mathematically sophisticated
examination comparing the probable success rates under districts
or STV of ethnic-backed candidates is a project that could be
done, and perhaps should be done before a final decision is made.
It was not a project, however, that could be done within the time
frame and budget of this report.
Similarly, racially polarized voting by the white majority could
impinge on ethnic choices succeeding under either system. If
there is any significant degree of such voting it might be more
effective in districts than under STV. This is also a matter
that could well be pursued further, but not one we were able to
pursue within our time, skill and budget constraints.
What is clear, in contrast to all these unanswered questions, is
that proportional methods, like districts, bring Latinos much
closer to placing their choice on City Council. Unlike
districts, they avoid a possible forced choice between a Latino
and African-American candidate, and enable all members of each
group, regardless of place of residence, to unify behind a
candidate of its preference - or for that matter, to join
together. As such, it is hard to foresee a basis under which
such systems could be attacked as minority vote dilution.
Likewise, should the Council choose to follow our second
preference and institute districts, the City would likely,
provided it drew a district that nearly maximized minority voter
strength, be immune to voting rights litigation.
As the Commission on policy grounds recommends discontinuance of
the at-large plurality system, we hesitate to step into the shoes
of the City Attorney to advise Council on its voting rights law
risk exposure should it not abolish at-large elections.
There is no pending voting discrimination litigation, nor threat
of litigation, nor even rumor of a threat at this time.
However, we have heard enough discussion and read enough material
related to the question that we can say as a matter of prudent
management, that it would be unfortunate and unwise to maintain
in place a system the City might need to defend at great expense,
notwithstanding the likelihood that the City might ultimately
prevail.
By contrast, a move to a system that offered increased
opportunity for minority representation would be a defense to any
such suit. This, in our view, is yet one more reason - not the
most important one, but a significant one - for choosing one of
the electoral options we have recommended in the body of this
report.
FOOTNOTES
1) pg. 17 Welch & Bledsoe, "Urban Reform and Its Consequences",
P. 8.
2) pg. 18 Kousser Report, P. 14.
3) pg. 28 Baseline Data Report (International City Management
Ass'n.) Vol. 19, #6, P. 3.
4) pg. 32 Petrie and Tuchfarber, "Proportional Representation",
P. 37.
5) pg. 39 We assume here that there is no concerted
counter-strategy by the remaining four-fifths aimed
at exclusion of this group's candidate. The
Commission has not analyzed the likely outcomes of
such a hypothetical situation.
2) Question: Whether or not City Charter Section 602 should be
amended to provide compensation and benefits for
members of the City Council and if so, what
compensation and benefits should be provided?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 602. Compensation. The members of the
City Council shall receive no compensation for
their services as such, but shall receive
reimbursement for necessary travel and other
expenses when on official duty out of the City on
order of the City Council and, in addition, the
Mayor shall receive the sum of One Hundred and
Fifty ($150.00) Dollars per month, which amount
shall be deemed reimbursement out-of-pocket
expenditures and costs imposed upon him in serving
as Mayor, and all other members of the City Council
shall receive the sum of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars per
month, which amount shall be deemed to be
reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenditures and
costs imposed upon them in serving as City
Councilmen.
Discussion and Recommendation: The current Charter section,
while providing no compensation as such to Council members,
offers them $50 monthly "deemed to be reimbursement," in part,
for "costs imposed upon them in serving."
Since Santa Monica's Charter, with its "reimbursement" limit of
$50 per month, was adopted in 1946, the purchasing power of the
dollar has shrunk to less than one-sixth its magnitude of that
year, and median family income has multiplied more than
eleven-fold. Depending on what formula is chosen as a basis for
cost-of-living adjustment, the 1946 stipend would amount to at
least $330 per month or as much as $570 a month in today's
dollars. It is no longer reasonable, we believe, to regard the
sum specified in the 1946 Charter as appropriate "reimbursement"
for the time and energy required of Councilmembers.
The responsibilities of City Council service, as reported in
interviews with 13 past and present members, are the approximate
equivalent of a half-time job, averaging about 23 hours per week.
Council meetings alone consume almost 5 hours in the average
week, and preparation time-study of documents and consultation
with City employees - consumed another 4 hours. While these
Councilmembers reported wide variation in the amount of time
spent on dealing with constituent requests and complaints, on the
average, this activity absorbed more than 6 hours each week. Ad
hoc meetings, with City staff, with community groups, and liaison
duties with City commissions, took up another 5 to 5 1/2 hours,
and miscellaneous tasks including correspondence, travel time and
member-initiated projects, was estimated at a further 2 1/2 to 3
hours per week. The lowest amount of total weekly time reported
was 11 to 15 hours and some Councilmembers customarily spent
upwards of 30 hours.
Time commitments of this scope make City Council service
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with full-time
employment elsewhere. As a result, in the view of the
Commission, the opportunity to serve on City Council is limited,
under the non-compensation provisions of the current Charter, to
retirees, dependents, the self-employed, or other persons
willing and able to make considerable financial sacrifices. Such
constraints on Council membership unreasonably exclude many Santa
Monicans who might render the City valuable time and talent.
General law cities in California specify formulae for city
council compensation based on the population of the municipality
concerned. For cities of Santa Monica's size, Council salaries
could be set at any figure up to $600 per month, and the
California State Government Code allows for cost-of-living
adjustments of up to 5% per annum for subsequent years. Many
charter cities in the metropolitan Los Angeles area appear to
have utilized the general law formula for cities of their size as
a guideline in adopting their own Council pay scales, although
the largest cities, where council service is deemed more
burdensome, pay higher salaries.
We asked 15 present and former Council members for their views on
appropriate remuneration levels. Those who were now retired from
office and thus able to speak with no prospect of personal gain
were almost all agreed on a range of $500 to $600 monthly.
Several pointed out that Santa Monica's intense and active
political culture demanded more time than would service in the
average city of the same size.
Among the 11 mid-sized Southern California cities we examined in
studying compensation and benefit levels, the base monthly salary
ranged from $100 to $1,625, with a median figure of $483 and
average of $543 per month.
Because of the obsolescence of the current Charter's figure
(enacted almost half a century ago), because we want to open
Council service to all, because Santa Monica's practice of no
Council compensation is out of step with almost all
jurisdictions, and because the time demands of Council service in
Santa Monica are equivalent to a part-time job, the Commission
recommends removal of Section 602 of the Charter.
In lieu of the current Charter provisions, the Commission
recommends that the Charter set compensation ceilings according
to the population-based formula for general law cities (i.e. up
to $600/month), thus allowing the Council to set an initial
figure within that specified range. Should the Council wish to
create differential remuneration for the Mayor, it would have
discretion to do so within the range limit set forth above.
The Commission further recommends that the Council give
consideration to developing a method by which there would be some
electoral controls over approving or disapproving of any
subsequent increases in compensation above the figure initially
set. Although State law provides for City Councils to increase
their compensation based on CPI factors, we advise against a
system in which the Council proposes its own pay raises. Such
procedures, while not uncommon, tend to generate public antipathy
and acrimonious debate. Alternatively, an independent commission
could review remuneration, or recommend guidelines, (such as
CPI-based increases).
Further, since in our judgment, adequate performance in elective
office is often incompatible with a full-time job elsewhere, past
and prospective members of City Council have found it and may
find it difficult to receive or maintain health insurance and
related benefits.
It is in the City's interest to see that City Councilmembers,
like any City employee, are afforded adequate access to health
and dental care, in order that their performance not be
interrupted or curtailed by illness. We note that both the Santa
Monica - Malibu Unified School Board members and the Santa Monica
Community College Trustees have medical insurance coverage.
The Commission requested a survey be made of benefits offered
Council members in 11 Southern California cities, ranging in size
from El Segundo to Long Beach. All cities provided city-paid
health insurance contributions ranging from approximately $200 up
to $658 a month (except for an $837 maximum for combined health,
dental, psychological and life insurance coverage offered by one
city). Dental coverage with a city contribution was available in
all 11 cities. With one exception, life insurance was also
offered, with benefits rising, in three cities, to $100,000.
In addition to these benefits, about half of these cities
provided their Councils with auto allowances - from $125 to $450
monthly - or with use of city vehicles. In determining the
benefits available, the city administrators interviewed explained
the benefits extended to city department heads is often used as a
basis.
We recommend that Councilmembers be extended the same insurance
benefits as the top administrative bargaining unit of Santa
Monica City employees, with the exception of participation in the
Public Employees Retirement System. Due to differences in
perspectives related to the issues of benefits and pay, as
represented by the opinions of the Commissioners, and the
likelihood that the electorate may have different positions on
these two issues, we recommend that they be separate ballot
measures if submitted to the electorate.
3) Question: Whether or not any limitation should be placed on
the terms of office of members of the City Council.
Discussion and Recommendation: The Commission was closely
divided on the question of term limits for City Council members.
A majority (7 of 13) of Commission members supported limiting
City Council members to three consecutive 4-year terms. A
smaller group would have left the tenure of members to the
discretion of the electorate on a case-by-case basis. Both
supporters and opponents of the policy justified their positions
as being in line with various tenets of democratic theory and
tradition.
Proponents suggested that the opportunity for more people to
serve on Council would encourage citizens to participate in civic
life and to serve on boards and commissions as training grounds
for Council. This conjecture is supported by the experience of
at least one city - Kansas City, Missouri - where the election
following the institution of term limits produced a record number
of Council candidates.
It was also suggested that greater turnover of Council members
would stimulate voter interest in Santa Monica's political life.
Some limit advocates believe that lengthy service permits a
Council member to become removed from the experience of everyday
residents. This was countered by the suggestion that long tenure
in office allows independence from blocs and pressure groups, in
part because the understanding of civic affairs developed over
years of service provides an independent check on the
self-interested arguments of special interests.
Advocates of limits suggested that frequent infusion of new blood
into the Council would be beneficial in creating an openness to
new ideas. Veteran office-holders, some suggested, are sometimes
too concerned with maintaining established routines and
justifying past performances, rather than looking at current
problems with a fresh eye.
Finally, some misgivings were held regarding the long-term
incumbent's electoral advantages. A level playing field, some
felt, was impossible in a contest against a veteran whose
longevity made his/her name a household word.
A substantial minority of Commissioners rejected any limitation,
largely for two reasons. Some felt long service was a valuable
thing in itself, in so far as experience contributed to
efficiency in decision making, added to the collective storehouse
of civic knowledge and was a resource for novices on the council.
It was pointed out that government has many technical aspects,
which cannot be learned overnight, so the constituents may suffer
from the inexperience of elected officials.
Others, while not necessarily advocates of long service, felt
that a prohibition on it would be an unwarranted imposition on
the public's right to choose their representatives, and a
curtailment of the democratic process. As the California Supreme
Court said in the context of striking down a candidate residency
requirement:
"...in judging the validity of a restraint upon
eligibility for elective office, we must be
mindful that the restraint is upon the right to
vote as well..."
(Zeilinga v. Nelson, 4 Cal 3d at 721)
Term limits have recently been imposed for state legislators in
Colorado and Oklahoma, and in California, by a narrowly approved
1990 initiative. It was argued that gerrymandering and
incumbents' massive campaign war chests combined to make
legislators virtually immune to electoral competition. It was a
fact that in recent years less than one incumbent in ten was
successfully challenged.
However, some Commissioners questioned whether the case made for
term limits in the California Legislature can be fairly applied
to Santa Monica's City Council. Santa Monica, not subject to
gerrymandering continues to have competitive elections. Nor is
long tenure on City Council pervasive. Among the 57 individuals
who have served on Council since the current Charter was adopted,
only 10 served more than eight consecutive years. A single term
was the most common experience, and the average length of service
for the 50 who have completed their terms was just over six
years.
Among neighboring jurisdictions, only Redondo Beach was found to
have a locally adopted term limit, that being two consecutive
terms.
In the minority's view, not only are there points of principle
against term limits, but the persuasive theoretical arguments for
them do not apply compellingly to Santa Monica's concrete
circumstances. Ultimately, the prevailing view on the Commission
was to recommend the adoption of a Charter section limiting
continuous service on council to three four-year terms. After a
period of absence from office, a person who had served three
terms would be again eligible for election.
4) Question: The method of selection of the City Attorney and
City Clerk
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 700. Officers to be Appoint-
ed by the City Council. The City
Council shall appoint the City Manager,
City Attorney and Health Officer, which
positions shall not be in the Classified
Service and who may be removed by motion
of the City Council adopted by at least
five affirmative votes.
It shall also appoint the City Clerk,
which position shall be in the Classified
Service.
Discussion and Recommendation: The Commission examined
selection practices for City Clerks and City Attorneys in a
number of neighboring jurisdictions. We also reviewed a
recent survey by the International Institute of Municipal
Clerks, covering 241 California cities. The latter study
indicated a two-to-one preference for appointed (160 cities)
over elected (81) City Clerks. Previous data gathered in
1983 suggests a trend away from the election option may well
have taken place in the past decade. In general, it is the
smaller cities where election of Clerks occurs, which may
reflect unwillingness on the part of larger jurisdictions to
accept the criteria used in the electoral process as
appropriate to filling a professional position.
Appointment of the Clerk is usually made by City Council in
charter cities, although in some smaller cities the City
Manager makes the appointment. This practice often evolved
because, at an earlier time, the City Manager served in a
dual capacity as City Clerk. A survey of 29 cities in
Southern California revealed only four instances of
appointment by City Managers, one of these requiring Council
approval. Santa Monica's selection process is consistent
with the practice of most jurisdictions, and the Commission
saw no persuasive reason for amending it.
City Attorneys in California are overwhelmingly appointed;
there are approximately 10 elected City Attorneys among over
400 in the state.
In view of the above information, and of recent voter action
on the question of an elected City Attorney, the Commission
did not see a need to change the existing appointive
procedure. We recommend retention of Section 700 with its
current provisions for appointment of City Clerk and City
Attorney.
For a discussion of the Health Officer, please see Question
8.
5a) Question: Should Boards and Commissions established by
Charter remain so mandated?
Discussion and Recommendation: The City's sixteen boards
and commissions are established in two ways - eleven by
ordinance and five by Charter mandate.
Charter Municipal Code
Airport Commission Accessibility Appeals Board
Library Board Architectural Review Board
Personnel Board Arts Commission
Planning Commission Building and Safety Commission
Recreation Commission Commission on Older Americans
Commission on Status of Women
Electrical Board of Appeals
Housing Commission
Landmarks Commission
Plumbing & Mechanical Board
of Appeals
Social Services Commission
Those advisory bodies created by the Charter tend to relate
to activities/functions that will always be under the
purview of the City. Those created by ordinance reflect
responsiveness over time to changing conditions and issues
in the City. The advantages of the ability to create boards
and commissions by ordinance include timeliness and
flexibility in establishing advisory governing structures
which best meet the current needs of the community.
The Commission recommends no substantive changes be made in
the Charter's formula for establishment authority of City
boards and commissions. However, to conform with currently
used nomenclature, the Charter's reference to the Recreation
Commission should be redesignated the Recreation and Parks
Commission.
5b) Question: Should the current method of selection of
Planning Commissioners be retained?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 1007. Planning Commission.
There shall be a City Planning Commission
appointed by the City Council, one member to be
elected from its own membership to provide active
liaison with the Commission, but who shall
neither have a vote nor be eligible to be
chairman thereof, and seven members from the
qualified electors of the City, none of whom
shall hold any paid office or employment in the
City government. The City Engineer and City
Attorney, or their assistants, shall be in
attendance at all regular meetings of the
Commission.
Discussion and Recommendation: At the Commission's request,
the Planning Division contacted 20 California cities of
various sizes throughout California to inquire about the
process used to select planning commissioners. And attempt
was made to include cities with a reputation for innovation.
As well as ascertaining the mechanics of the selection
process, this survey inquired into the views of senior
planning staff about the merits of that city's system.
In each city we sought to find out: whether planning
commissioners are appointed or elected; whether selected
at-large or by district; who actually selects the
commissioners; whether there are any minimum requirements or
qualifications for the position; how vacancies are
advertised; whether commissioners receive any compensation;
whether there are term limits; and how often the commission
meets.
The survey findings, and comments made by city staff persons
about various aspects of the selection process can be
summarized as follows:
Appointment vs. Election:
All of the cities contacted utilized appointments as opposed
to elections. Many interviewees felt that elections would
further politicize a process that was already political
enough.
Procedures for Appointment:
The 20 cities polled rely upon three basic models for
appointing commissioners: by the mayor, by individual
councilmembers, and by majority council vote. Appointment
by the mayor occurs in just under half the cities examined.
In most cases, however, the mayor's appointment is subject
to City Council approval. Likewise, in the one-third of
the cities in which each Councilmember appoints a
commissioner, these are usually subject to approval by the
entire Council. Some staff considered the latter system to
be likely to constrain independent thinking by
commissioners.
Other Issues:
o Compensation and term limits were not regarded as major
issues in most cities.
o Some staff believed that professional knowledge or
experience requirements would be beneficial to the
commission in areas such as architecture, planning and
real estate development.
o Only two of the 20 cities appoint commissioners by
district--Inglewood and Pomona.
Santa Monica Planning Commission's Views
To deepen our understanding of these issues as they have
confronted Santa Monica, we also asked that the Planning Division
discuss them with our own Commissioners. They interviewed four
current and three past members of the Planning Commission. In
short, they support the current method of Planning Commission
selection. Their reasons for this are summarized below:
Advantages of the Existing Selection Process
o Open Process: Several commissioners commented that the
current practice of noticing Planning Commission vacancies
to the general public represents a fair, open approach
which--in theory, at least--permits diverse backgrounds and
ideas on the commission.
o Independence: Many felt that appointing commissioners
at-large and subject to City Council approval lends greater
independence to the Commission than would individual
Council appointments and/or appointments by district.
Disadvantages of the Existing Selection Process
o Theory vs. Practice: Several commissioners commented that
the current selection process is open and democratic in
theory but in practice is subject to back room deal-making
and generally reserved for the politically "connected."
o Noticing: Some felt that an inadequate public noticing of
Commission vacancies contributes to the "political" nature
in Planning Commission appointments. They suggested that
more effort should go into noticing vacancies widely to the
general public.
o Insufficient Criteria/Requirements: It was the view of
several commissioners that the existing
application/screening process for Commissioners was too
arbitrary and should be strengthened by incorporating
certain criteria for background, skills, and experience in
such areas as development, architecture, planning, business,
and/or community organizing. Commissioners generally felt
that a more rigorous screening would bring more relevant
expertise to the commission, and make the process less
"political" and more objective.
Overall Rating of System/Alternatives
The general sentiment of the commissioners can be summarized as
follows: that the requirement for a majority council vote to
appoint commissioners is good; that making applications for
Planning Commission seats available to the general public is
good; but that the public noticing and screening processes for
Commission appointments are inadequate.
Alternatives to a majority vote by Council--such as appointments
by mayor, subject to mayoral approval, or by district--were
considered too prone to "politics". Some Commissioners added
that the staggering of Commission and Council terms lends greater
independence to commissioners.
Terms and Term Limits
Almost all Commissioners felt that the existing term limits of
two four-year terms were adequate. Several commented that it
takes at least one year just to become acquainted with the issues
and procedures. One Commissioner noted that most Commissioners
"burn out" before ever reaching the end of their eighth year.
Compensation
Most Commissioners considered the current compensation level of
$25 per meeting adequate and found the real reward to be in
community service. At the same time, some of the same
commissioners felt there should be greater recognition by the
city for their work. Several commissioners felt the current
stipend was not enough, suggesting alternatives from $50 or $100
- up to a professional salary.
In addition to giving the Charter Review Commission its views on
selection and compensation, the Planning Commission also
recommended changes with respect to other ramifications of this
Charter section. Among the recommended changes are the
following:
o City Council Liaison: Section 1007 of the City Charter
states that the City Council shall appoint one of its
own members to be a non-voting member of the Planning
Commission to "provide active liaison with the
Commission". While a majority of the Planning
Commission supports the liaison role, it opposes the
liaison being a member of the Planning Commmission.
Commissioners felt that the City Council already
exercises ample veto authority over Planning Commission
actions, and that the liaison as Planning Commission
member tends to undermine the independence of the
Commission.
Accordingly, the Planning Commission's first preference
would be that any reference to City Council liaison be
removed entirely from City Charter, and that the Council
continue to assign a liaison informally; or, if the City
Council wishes to maintain the reference to the liaison
in the City Charter, that at least the reference to the
liaison as member of the Planning Commission be removed.
The Charter Review Commission adopted the latter
proposal and incorporates such language in its proposed
revision.
o "Qualified Elector": Section 1007 of the City Charter
requires the members of the Planning Commission be
"qualified electors" of the City. The Planning
Commission recommended that the Charter Review
Commission and City Council carefully reconsider this
requirement. Several commissioners felt strongly that
while members should be required to be residents of the
City, it is in their opinion not necessary that they be
citizens of the country. The Charter Review Commission
concurred and have incorporated this concept in the
proposed revision.
o Attendance by City Engineer at Meetings: Section 1007
of the City Charter stipulates that the City Engineer or
his assistant shall attend all Planning Commission
meetings. The Commission recommended that this language
be removed, as the City Engineer typically attends
meetings only when his expertise is required. In our
proposed revision, we incorporate this recommendation.
Two other items go beyond the parameters set by the City
Council in its direction to the Charter Review Commission,
but as the Planning Commission felt them to be sufficiently
important to forward to the City Council, the Charter Review
Commission does so below, without recommendation.
o Term Expiration: Section 1002 of the City
Charter stipulates the Planning Commissioner's term
shall expire on July 1st. Because the City Council is
usually occupied with the City budget at that time of
year, the Planning Commission recommended moving the
expiration date up to March or April.
o Annual Adjustment to Monetary Compensation: Section
1005 of the City Charter stipulates that compensation
for Planning Commissioners may be increased by an amount
equal to the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
for each calendar year. The Commission requested that
this be changed to say that the amount of compensation
will be automatically adjusted each year by an amount
equal to the increase in the CPI.
On the basis of the data learned from the two studies, the
Charter Review Commission concludes that the manner of selecting
Planning Commissioners now in force should be retained, with the
minor modifications specified above.
Proposed Wording
SECTION 1007. Planning Commission.
There shall be a City Planning Commission appointed by
the City Council, and composed of seven members chosen
from the residents of the City, none of whom shall hold
any paid office or employment in the City government.
The City Council may select one of its members to
provide active liaison with the Commission, but the
Councilmember chosen shall neither have a vote on the
Commission nor be eligible to be its chairperson. The
City Attorney, or his or her designee, shall be in
attendance at all regular meetings of the Commission.
6 &
7) Question: Whether City Charter Section 612 relating to
special meetings should be amended to conform to
the Brown Act and whether Section 613 should be
amended to provide more flexibility in holding
Council meetings within the City?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 612. Special Meetings. Special
meetings may be called at any time by
the Mayor, or by four members of the
City Council, by written notice deli-
vered personally to each member at least
three hours before the time specified
for the proposed meeting. A special
meeting shall also be validly called,
without the giving of such written
notice, if all members shall give their
consent, in writing, to the holding of
such meeting and such consent is on file
in the office of the City Clerk at the
time of holding such meeting. A tele-
graphic communication from a member
consenting to the holding of a meeting
shall be considered a consent in writing.
At any special meeting only such matters
may be acted upon as are referred to in
such written notice or consent.
SECTION 613. Place of Meetings. All
meetings shall be held in the Council
Chambers of the City Hall and shall be
open to the public. If, by reason of
fire, flood or other emergency, it shall
be unsafe to meet in the place designated,
the meetings may be held for the duration
of the emergency at such place as is desig-
nated by the Mayor or, if he should fail
to act, by four members of the City Council.
Discussion and Recommendation: The Brown Act, found in
Government Code Section 54950 et seq., is the core of the
state's commitment to make public most of the official
business of government. This law applies to all cities
including Santa Monica. Among the law's features are the
requirement that agendas be published in advance of public
meetings, restrictions on closed or executive sessions, and
mandated opportunities for members of the public to speak.
In 1990, the state deleted from its budget any obligation to
fund cities for their expenses related to the Brown Act.
This had the effect of making the City's compliance with
some provisions of the Act voluntary. In response to this
change, the City Council adopted Ordinance #1556 mandating
that the City comply with the Brown Act.
Ordinance 1556 governs notice procedure for regular meetings
of City Council, or any City board or commission, and also
for special or emergency meetings of any of these bodies.
For regular meetings, 72-hour prior posting of time, place,
and agenda items is required; the body's action is
restricted to posted agenda items, except in unusual
circumstances: 1) by majority declaration of a public health
or safety emergency; 2) if by a two-thirds or more majority
vote the body agrees that the need for action arose after
the agenda was posted; 3) in the case of an item continued
from a meeting in the five days before the meeting in
question.
Ordinance 1556 also addresses notice procedure for special
and emergency meetings, requiring posting of time, place and
agenda of special meetings 24 hours prior to their
occurrence; restricting the agenda to posted items (barring
a health or safety emergency); and prescribes notice to the
body's members as in Government Code Section 54956.
Finally, this section mandates emergency meetings of City
bodies to be called and conducted in accordance with
Government Code Section 54956.5.
Charter Section 612 sets forth various provisions for
calling special meetings which vary from, or conflict with,
the provisions of the Brown Act and terms of Ordinance 1556.
It permits, among other things special meetings to be called
on three hours advance notice while Ordinance 1556, in
conformity with the Brown Act, suggests 24 hours notice.
The Commission concluded that this section should be revised
to prescribe that the calls for such meetings conform with
State law.
The Commission considered the inclusion in the Charter of
other specific requirements for public notice and public
input covered by the Brown Act but, noting that there were
few if any cities inserting such provisions in their
charters, recommends instead that the Charter simply
enunciate the principles of timely and adequate public
notice, and of sufficient provisions for public input,
leaving the City Council to articulate from time to time by
ordinance, the exact definitions of these terms.
It should be noted that neither original nor proposed texts
of Section 612 or 613 regulates the operation of City boards
or commissions as Ordinance 1556 does.
Regarding the matter of meeting location, we reviewed the
regulations of a number of jurisdictions in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area. In all cases, charter provisions or
ordinances designate Council Chambers as the place of
regular meetings. However, a majority provide for
flexibility by specifying alternate locations, providing for
adjournment to another place, or allowing change of meeting
place by ordinance.
Under the rewritten section, Council would be able to hold
meetings in larger quarters, when the level of public
interest warrants it, or to take meetings to neighborhoods
when the issues to be dealt with might be of primary
interest to residents of one area.
We propose the following substitutes for Sections 612 and
613, which, we believe, will adequately protect the public
right to access and input while allowing flexibility with
regard to meeting locations.
Proposed Wording
SECTION 612. Special and Emergency Meetings.
The City Council may call special or emergency
meetings at locations, upon notice, and in
accordance with procedures as permitted by law.
SECTION 613. Open Meetings.
Unless otherwise permitted by federal or state
law, City Council meetings shall be open and
accessible to all members of the public. The
City Council may hold its meetings in the City
Council Chambers of the City Hall or at such
other locations as the City Council may by
ordinance or resolution designate.
The City Council shall by ordinance establish
procedures for informing the public of its
meetings. The ordinance shall ensure that, to
the maximum extent feasible, the public is
provided with timely and adequate notice of City
Council agenda and that the public is provided
with the opportunity to comment on proposed City
Council actions.
8) Question: Whether City Charter Section 717 relating to a
City Health Officer should be deleted?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 717. Health Officer. Powers
and Duties. To be eligible for appoint-
ment to the position of Health Officer,
the appointee shall be licensed to
practice medicine in the State of
California and shall be selected on
the basis of his qualifications or
experience in public health work. The
Health Officer shall have power and
be required to:
(a) Exercise general supervision
over conditions of health and cleanli-
ness in the City and take all necessary
measures for the preservation and pro-
motion thereof; and
(b) Enforce all laws, ordinances
and regulations relative to the preser-
vation and improvement of public health,
including those provided for the preven-
tion of disease, the maintenance of
sanitary conditions and the inspection
and supervision of the production,
transportation, storage and sale of
foodstuffs.
The City Council may contract with the
County of Los Angeles, or any other
public health organization, for the
performance of any or all functions in
connection with public health matters.
Discussion and Recommendation: Currently, City Charter
Section 717 provides the option for a Health Officer. The
section also allows the City Council to contract with the
County of Los Angeles, or any other public health
organization, for the performance of any or all public
health functions. We recommend deletion of this Charter
section. At least since the 1950's there has not been a
City Health Officer, the City opting instead to contract
with the County of Los Angeles for all public health
functions.
A number of City departments utilize the services of the
County of Los Angeles Health Department. The City Building
Division looks to County health inspectors for certification
of restaurant occupancy requirements; as does the Fire
Department for licensing of large day care centers and
retirement or nursing homes. The City Business Licensing
Office similarly relies on Health Department certification
of food vendors. The City's environmental officers use
County Health services for laboratory analysis and
investigations of some hazardous or toxic materials.
These various City departments have cited no problems with
services provided by the County. Both the Fire Department
and the Environmental Programs Division view County response
to hazardous materials spills, in particular, as excellent.
Because of this cooperative and satisfactory arrangement
between Santa Monica and the County, there appears to be no
need for the appointment of a Health Officer nor for
establishment of a City health department.
Three California cities (Long Beach, Berkeley and Pasadena),
currently operate their own health departments,
administering public health clinics and disease prevention
and mental health programs, as well as environmental health
and hazardous materials services. While the majority of the
funding of these programs comes from the State, cities are
increasingly required to rely on their own resources to
continue programs which are being cut back by the State.
The commission does not believe it would be prudent to take
over the health function, nor does it believe the
appointment of a health officer is necessary to oversee the
County of Los Angeles. The City would not be able, within
the current allocated resources, to perform all functions
currently carried out by the County.
In consideration of the County's performance record, we
recommend the health officer section be deleted from the
Charter. Reference to the Health Officer position also
occurs in Section 700, where it should, for the sake of
consistency, be deleted as well.
It is important to note that deletion of this position from
the Charter would in no way preclude the City Council from
future creation of such a position by ordinance or in the
annual budget process, if this were warranted by changed
conditions or desire to undertake expanded health-related
responsibilities.
9) Question: Whether City Charter Section 1515 relating to
claims against the City should be required to
conform to State law?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 1515. Actions Against City.
No suit shall be brought on any claim
for money or damages against the City
or any board or commission thereof until
a demand for the same has been presented
as herein provided and rejected in whole
or in part. If rejected in part, suit
may be brought to recover the whole.
Except in those cases where a shorter
time is otherwise provided by law, all
claims for damages against the City
must be presented within six (6) months
after the occurrence, event or transaction
from which the damages allegedly arose,
and all other claims or demands shall be
presented within six (6) months after the
last item of the account or claim accrued.
Every claim for money or damages against
the City or any board or commission thereof
shall be filed with the City Clerk, who shall
thereupon present the same to the City Council,
officer, board or commission authorized by
this Charter to incur or pay the expenditure
or alleged indebtedness or liability repre-
sented thereby. In all cases such claims
shall be approved or rejected in writing and
the date thereof given. Failure to act upon
any claim or demand within sixty (60) days
from the date the same is filed with the City
Clerk, shall be deemed a rejection thereof.
Discussion and Recommendation: Charter Section 1515
provides a procedure for the presentation of claims against
the City which at one time mirrored in large part the
requirements of California State law. However, over the
years, the government tort liability acts have been modified
while the Charter provisions have remained frozen.
Under recent court decisions it is unclear to what extent a
charter city's tort claims provisions may differ from state
law obligations. An argument could be made that these
procedural prerequisites to the filing of lawsuits are a
matter of local concern and therefore a city need not comply
with state law.
The City does, however, comply with State law. Claims made
against the City are administered by the City's Risk
Management Division. This division adheres to the detailed
procedures listed in the California Government Code. While
the Risk Management Division is currently in conformance
with the procedures in the Santa Monica Charter, it complies
with an even more rigorous methodology as outlined in the
California Government Code. This procedure is the standard
of most municipalities.
The Commission recommends that the Charter be modified to
make clear that the relevant California Government Code
sections shall be the procedural standard for the filing of
claims against the City, and ensuing action thereupon.
In addition, the Commission considered it reasonable to
include in this section a statement that any decision by
City staff to deny a claim may be appealed to City Council.
The Commission proposes the following draft as a replacement
for Section 1515 as currently written:
Proposed Wording
Section 1515. Actions Against City.
No suit shall be brought on any demand for money
or damages against the City unless a claim has
been filed with the City Clerk in accordance with
the procedures established by state law. The
City Council may establish additional claims
procedures by ordinance.
In addition to other procedures as may be
established by law, any person aggrieved by a
City decision that rejects or denies, in whole or
in part, any demand or claim for money or damages
may request the City Council to approve the
demand or claim.
10) Question: Whether City Charter Section 608 should be
amended to increase the dollar amount requiring
competitive bidding on public works projects?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 608. Contracts on Public Works. Every
contract involving an expenditure of more than
Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars for the
construction or improvement (excluding
maintenance and repair) of public buildings,
works, streets, drains, sewers, utilities, parks
and playgrounds, and each separate purchase of
materials or supplies for the same, where the
expenditure required for such purchase shall
exceed the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00)
Dollars, shall be let to the lowest responsible
bidder after notice by publication in the
official newspaper by two or more insertions, the
first of which shall be at least ten days before
the time for opening bids.
The City Council may reject any and all bids
presented and may re-advertise in its discretion.
After rejecting bids, or if no bids are received,
the City Council may declare and determine that
in its opinion, the work in question may be
performed better or more economically by the City
with its own employees, or that the materials or
supplies may be purchased at a lower price in the
open market, and after the adoption of a
resolution to this effect by at least five
affirmative votes, it may proceed to have said
work done or such materials or supplies purchased
in the manner stated, without further observance
of the provisions of this section. Such contract
may be let and such purchases made without
advertising for bids, if such work or the
purchase of such materials or supplies shall be
deemed by the City Council to be of urgent
necessity for the preservation of life, health or
property, and shall be authorized by at least
five affirmative votes.
Discussion and Recommendation: Section 608 of the City
Charter requires competitive bidding for every public works
expenditure greater than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00).
Cities vary widely in their bid threshold amounts. For
instance, the charters of Torrance, Inglewood, Long Beach
and Glendale merely indicate that their respective City
Councils may by ordinance establish limits beyond which bids
are required. Burbank and Redondo Beach establish the
limits in their charters at Thirty Thousand Dollars
($30,000.00) and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00)
respectively. State law does not control the amount where a
bid is necessary. Santa Monica's present $5,000.00 bid
threshold has not been changed in 40 years, and is unusually
low in today's contract environment and as compared to other
cities.
City Formal Type Limit
Bid Limit Government Set By
Burbank $30,000 Charter Charter
Glendale $15,000 Charter Charter
Inglewood $40,000 Charter Ordinance
Long Beach $50,000 Charter Ordinance
Pasadena $25,000 Charter *Ordinance
Redondo Beach $50,000 Charter Charter
Torrance $24,999 Charter Ordinance
Bev. Hills, El Segundo
Hawthorne, Manhattan Beach, General State
West Hollywood $10,000 Law Law
* Charter sets the formal bid limit at an amount not to
exceed $75,000. The Council has set the limit at $25,000.
The Commission recommends modification of the Charter by
deleting the dollar amount for the formal bid limit. The
City Council would then be given the responsibility to
establish by ordinance an expenditure limit above which
competitive bidding would be required. This limit could be
revised when necessary by ordinance of the City Council and
would abide by State limits. This modification to the
Charter would allow the City to conduct business in a more
efficient and cost-effective manner. Allowing the Council
to set the limits would save the resources required to
conduct a public vote over an issue which is basically
technical and administrative in nature, and which will need
to be adjusted from time to time without a substantive
change in policy merely because of monetary inflation.
The City's Finance Director has currently determined that
raising the City's formal bid threshold from $5,000.00 will
require no change in the City's accounting procedures to
satisfy State law.
While favoring a reduction in the scope of this Charter
Section by raising the dollar threshold at which it comes
into force, the Commission felt this Section's application
should be broadened to cover personal and professional
services contracts, an area not mentioned in the current
Section 608. The Commission feels that explicit inclusion
of such contracts in this Section would bolster public
confidence in the integrity of the City's expenditure
procedures. The Commission also felt that different
threshold dollar limits are appropriate for different types
of expenditures.
Finally, the Commission felt that Santa Monica's commitment
to opportunity for minorities and other disadvantaged groups
should be expressed here in a clause mandating that bidding
procedures be tailored toward this goal.
To meet the objectives discussed above the Commission
proposes that Section 608 be revised as follows:
Proposed Wording
Section 608. Public Contracts.
The City Council shall, by ordinance, adopt
procedures and requirements for the purchase of
supplies and equipment; for the provision of
personal services, including without limitation,
professional consultant agreements in excess of
$50,000; and for the award of bids for public
works projects. Such an ordinance should
preserve public confidence in the integrity and
openness of the City contracting process, protect
public funds, and insure that the City obtains
materials or services of appropriate quality. To
the extent permitted by law, the City Council
shall adopt procedures which encourage the award
of City contracts to disadvantaged or minority
persons.
Pursuant to an ordinance duly adopted by the City
Council, the personal services agreements subject
to the dollar requirements of this Section may be
adjusted by an amount no greater than the
cumulative percentage increase in the Consumer
Price Index as measured from the operative date
of the last such adjustment, provided that such
adjustments shall occur only once in any five
year period. The Consumer Price Index (CPI)
shall be the CPI for All Urban Consumers for the
Los Angeles, Long Beach, Anaheim Metropolitan
Area (All Items), provided by the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics or other comparable
index determined to be appropriate by the City
Council.
11) Question: Whether City Charter Section 1300 relating to
official bonds should be amended or deleted?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 1300. Official Bonds. The
City Council shall fix by ordinance
the amounts and terms of the official
bonds of all officials or employees
who are required by this Charter or
by ordinance to give such bonds. All
bonds shall be approved as to form by
the City Attorney, and, with the
exception of the bond of the City
Controller, shall be filed with the
City Controller. The Controller's
bond shall be filed with the City
Clerk. Premiums on official bonds
shall be paid by the City.
In all cases wherein an employee of
the City is required to furnish a
faithful performance bond, there
shall be no personal liability upon,
or any right to recover against, his
superior officer or other officer or
employee, or the bond of the latter,
unless such superior officer, or
other officer or employee is a party
to, or has conspired in, the wrongful
act causing directly or indirectly
such loss.
Discussion and Recommendation: Section 1300 of the City
Charter is a broad provision authorizing the City Council to
establish by ordinance the terms and amounts of any bonds
that city employees shall be required to furnish.
Official Bonds
Many cities (for example, Burbank, Redondo Beach, Inglewood,
Torrance and Glendale), include a similar performance bond
provision in their charters. The various city charter
provisions either identify specific officials and employees
who will be subject to performance bonds or delegate this
responsibility to the City Council.
Section 2612b - Faithful Performance Bonds, of the Santa
Monica Municipal Code lists those officials for whom bonds
must be posted to the City, and includes all department
directors, the Assistant City Manager and the City Manager.
The Commission believes performance bonds are in the best
interests of the City. The bonds provide protection in the
event of an official's or employee's failure, which could be
intentional, such as embezzlement, or unintentional, such as
an incorrect payment. Above all, the faithful performance
bond protects the City and ultimately the taxpayer from loss
of public money or property. The Commission believes this
provision should remain in the City's charter, though with
the removal of gender-specific language and deletion of
specific formulae governing the approval and posting of
bonds, matters which, in the Commission's view, may be
better left to City Council to set from time to time as
circumstances warrant. We propose the following language as
a substitute for Section 1300 as now written:
Proposed Wording
Section 1300. Official and Employee Bonds.
The City Council shall establish by ordinance the
amounts, terms and conditions of any official
bonds required of officials or employees.
Premiums on official bonds shall be paid by the
City.
12) Question: Whether City Charter Section 1509 relating to
Cash Basis Fund and City Charter Section 1511
relating to Capital Outlays Fund should be
amended or deleted?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 1509. Cash Basis Fund. The
City Council shall maintain a revolving
fund, to be known as the "Cash Basis
Fund", for the purpose of placing the
payment of the running expenses of the
City on a cash basis. A sufficient
reserve shall be built up in this fund
from any available sources with which
to meet all lawful demands against the
City for the first five months, or other
necessary period, of the succeeding
fiscal year prior to the receipt of ad
valorem tax revenues. Transfers may be
made by the City Council from such fund
to any other fund or funds of such sum
or sums as may be required for the pur-
pose of placing such funds, as nearly as
possible, on a cash basis.
All moneys so transferred from the Cash
Basis Fund shall be returned thereto
before the end of the fiscal year.
SECTION 1511. Capital Outlays Fund.
A fund for capital outlays, generally,
is hereby created, to be known as the
"Capital Outlays Fund." The City Council
by ordinance may create a special fund
or funds for a special capital outlay
purpose. The City Council may levy and
collect taxes for capital outlays and
may include in the annual tax levy a
levy for such purposes in which event
it must apportion and appropriate to
any such fund or funds the moneys de-
rived from such levy. It may not, in
making such levy, exceed the maximum
tax rate provided for in this Charter,
unless authorized by the affirmative
votes of a majority of the electors
voting on the proposition at any
election at which such question is
submitted. The City Council may
transfer to any such fund any unen-
cumbered surplus funds remaining on
hand in the City at any time.
Once created, such fund shall remain
inviolate for the purposes for which
it was created; if, for capital
outlays, generally, then for any such
purposes and if for a special capital,
outlay, then for such purpose only,
unless the assent of the voters is
expressed to the use of such fund for
some other purpose by majority vote
of the electors voting in favor there-
of at a general or special election
at which such proposition is submitted.
Discussion and Recommendation: Both sections currently
contain pre-Proposition 13 language which assumes that the
City's primary revenue source is the Property Tax and that
the City Council still has the ability to directly revise
the annual Property Tax levy. Neither assumption holds true
today since:
1) The City has other major local tax sources of revenue
(e.g. the Sales Tax, Utility Users Tax, Real Property
Transfer Tax, Transient Occupancy Tax and Business
License Tax), receipts from which are received monthly
rather than having to wait five months into the fiscal
year to receive the first distributions of the Property
Tax; and
2) Any increase in the Property Tax above Proposition 13
limits must be voter approved.
Because substantial city income now flows on a monthly
rather than annual basis, the Commission recommends the
deletion of language in Section 1509 tying cash reserve size
to specific time periods. Much of Section 1511 must be
deleted to bring its provisions into conformity with Prop.
13's restrictions on property tax levies. To preserve
existing powers of City Council while simplifying and
modernizing Charter language, the commission recommends
adoption of the following modifications in these sections.
Proposed Wording
Section 1509. Cash Liquidity Reserve.
The City Council shall maintain a Cash Liquidity
Reserve Account in the General Fund for the
purpose of assuring the payment of the operating
expenses of the City on a cash basis. A
sufficient reserve shall be built up in this
account from any available sources. Transfers
may be made by the City Council from this account
to any other fund of such sums as may be required
for the purpose of placing such funds, as nearly
as possible, on a cash basis.
All monies so transferred from the Cash Liquidity
Reserve Account shall be returned thereto before
the end of the fiscal year.
Section 1511. Capital Expenditures Fund.
The City Council by ordinance may create capital
expenditure funds. The City Council may transfer
to any such fund any unencumbered surplus funds
remaining on hand in the City at any time, or any
other funds which the City Council may lawfully
raise.
There was a suggestion to add language to Section 1511
which would give voters the right to vote on capital
expenditure funds in the event that Proposition 13 were
to be revised or repealed. The Commission concluded
such a revision should be submitted to the voters as a
separate charter amendment, if and when such
circumstances arise.
13) Question: Whether the portion of City Charter Section 1513
relating to the presentation of demands should be
amended or deleted?
Existing City Charter:
SECTION 1513. Presentation of Demands.
All demands against the City for which
appropriations have been made, before
being paid, shall be presented to and
approved by the City Manager. Demands
for which no appropriations have been
made shall be presented to the City
Council for approval. Any person
dissatisfied with the refusal of the
City Manager to approve any demand, in
whole or in part, may present the same
to the City Council,which, after examin-
ing into the matter, may approve or
disapprove the demand, in whole or in
part.
Discussion and Recommendation: Charter Section 1513's
first section is concerned with the payment of demands
whether from funds previously appropriated by the City
Council or from unappropriated reserves. The Section
provides that the City Manager is to approve all demands
from appropriations while any demands for which there is no
appropriation must be approved by the City Council.
In practice, once an appropriation has been made by the City
Council and an account established, payment of demands
against the account must be approved by the individual
department concerned with the payment and then the Finance
Department. The City Manager rarely becomes directly
involved in this approval process. Under accounting
controls established by the City Manager, the Finance
Department must give final approval for all appropriated
funds. Thus, the financial control and accounting system is
self-executing without the specific approval of the City
Manager.
With respect to demands against unappropriated funds, this
situation does require City Council approval.
City Council approval of claims is either individual and
specific or general and delegated to staff, depending on the
amount involved. This Charter Section's prescription for
the involvement of the City Manager is not a practical one,
given the volume of claims made against the City arising
from the vastly expanded range of government activity.
From a practical point of view, there appears to be little
need for the specific language of this part of Section 1513.
Under Section 704 of the Charter, the City Manager is
already responsible for the finances of the City and for the
administration of budgetary matters. These general duties
would seem to encompass the particular tasks enumerated in
Section 1513. Further, Charter Sections 1503 - 1506 discuss
budget appropriation requirements.
The Commission, therefore, recommends deletion of paragraph
one of Section 1513 as duplicative of other Charter
provisions which adequately address the matter of financial
management controls and responsibilities.